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Nondiscrimination laws have come to play a central role in the
design of public policy in the modem welfare state. Such laws place
those who administer them in the difficult business of allocating scarce
resources, regulating conflicting interests, and attempting to shape
complex institutional behavior. The egalitarian vision that inspires
such laws and the rhetorical and political energy that generate their
enactment, however, are not easily accommodated to the underlying
moral and decisional complexities of the regulatory task. These com-
plexities inevitably disturb the tranquil surface of the law where formal
simplicity and moral clarity dwell.
This Article examines the Age Discrimination Act of 19751 (ADA),
and explores the conflict between the criteria of social choice that
decisionmakers wish to employ, and the moral and legal constraints
that nondiscrimination laws seek to impose upon such criteria. The
Article consists of four parts. Part I describes the ADA and contrasts
it with earlier nondiscrimination laws, especially the prohibition on
race discrimination in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. A
critical analysis of the putative analogy between race discrimination
and age discrimination reveals the distinctive characteristics of age and
the principal considerations that ought to govern the use of age as a
criterion of classification. I argue that the ADA's attempt to fuse two
distinct types of group protection statutes has yielded a hybrid form
that constitutes a problematic policy instrument.
Part II traces the evolution of the ADA: the legal and political con-
texts out of which it emerged; its legislative history; the Civil Rights
Commission study on age discrimination mandated by the ADA; and
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the 1978 amendments to the statute. This account (as I argue in Part
IV) reveals a sweeping abdication by Congress and the Executive
Branch of their most elementary policymaking functions, leaving a
conceptual void concerning the nature of the age discrimination prob-
lem. Part III analyzes the principal legal and policy issues that agencies
and courts must resolve as they interpret the broad statutory exclusions
and exceptions in the ADA. Employing the approach to age discrimina-
tion presented in Part I, I argue that the ADA's exceptions should be
construed in a latitudinarian fashion, leaving most age classifications
intact.
Part IV develops some of the themes adumbrated earlier in the
Article. In particular, I argue that the breakdown of the conventional
policymaking process both affected and was affected by a confusion
about the nature and extent of age discrimination, and that this break-
down led directly to the distinctive kind of hybrid legislative form that
constitutes the ADA. I conclude by considering some possible con-
sequences of the ADA for the substance and process of social welfare
policy.
I. Defining the Problem: The ADA and the Analogy to Title VI
A. The Statutory Scheme
The essential structure of the ADA is simple. It prohibits discrim-
ination on the basis of age in all federally assisted programs and
activities, 2 and then excludes from coverage those programs or activities
"established under authority of any law" employing age criteria to
condition benefits or participation, 3 as well as certain employment-
related programs or activities. 4 In addition, the statute provides several
broadly worded "reasonableness" exceptions from the prohibition.,
Finally, it requires each federal agency or department to issue imple-
menting regulations; 6 enforcement of the statute is to be by the agencies
and departments7 and, after the 1978 amendments, by private court
action."
2. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1976).
3. Id. § 6103(b)(2).
4. Id. § 6103(c)(1) (broadly excluding practices of any employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or labor-management joint-apprenticeship program receiving Com-
prehensive Employment and Training Act funds).
5. Id. § 6103(b)(1)(A)-(B).
6. Id. § 6103(a).
7. Id. § 6104.
8. Amendments to the Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 95-478, § 401(c), 92
Stat. 1555 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6104 (West 1979)).
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The ADA is the offspring of-indeed, is expressly modeled upon-
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 0 which prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, or national origin in federally assisted
programs. The ADA employs prohibitory language virtually identical
to that in Title VI and in its progeny, Title IX of the Education
Act of 197210 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.11
In its various statutory contexts, this language confers upon a large
number of individuals a legal remedy against discrimination on the
basis of particular characteristics-race, color, national origin, and
handicap-in the vast range of activities that receive some federal as-
sistance.' 2 In adding age to the list of protected characteristics, Con-
gress stressed that the ADA does not protect merely the elderly or
persons who attain a particular age, but all persons at all times dur-
ing their lives.13 Nevertheless, Congress clearly had the elderly pri-
marily in mind.14
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) [statute hereinafter cited as Title VI]; see H.R. REP. No.
670, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1975) reprinted in part in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1290, 1323 (noting Title VI was model for ADA but stressing significant differences)
[hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT with citations to pages in original Report].
10. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) (prohibiting sex discrimination in federally assisted
educational programs) [statute hereinafter cited as Title IX].
11. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination on basis of physical or mental
handicap in federally assisted programs).
12. Other modern civil rights provisions are more restricted in scope because of limits
on either the size of the protected group or the range of activities affected. Other than
the ADA, the central statute protecting the elderly is the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-256,
§ 2(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ADEA], which prohibits discrimination in
employment against persons aged 40 to 65 (or to age 70 for certain categories of employ-
ment). For examples of other limited civil rights provisions, see Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (prohibiting discrimination in employment
on basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin) and the Education for All Handi-
capped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1412(1) (1976) (establishing require-
ments for educating handicapped children).
13. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 67, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1975) (Older Americans
Amendments of 1975 "aimed at eliminating age discrimination at all levels") [herein-
after cited as HousE REPORT]; 121 CONG. REC. 9212 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas).
14. 121 CONG. REc. 9212 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas) (noting act is principally
intended to counteract prejudice against elderly). Thus, the ADA implicitly pursues
somewhat conflicting goals: prohibition of differential treatment on the basis of age
("age-blindness"), and preference for a particular age group thought to be especially
disadvantaged. This conflict between the desire to render the law "blind" as to a
particular attribute and the desire to prefer one group thought to be disadvantaged be-
cause of that attribute in its competition with others is not confined to the ADA. The
Supreme Court has held that Title VI and Title VII were not intended to be "color-
blind," but rather envisioned preferential treatment on behalf of blacks. United Steel-
workers of America v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2727-28 (1979) (Title VII did not intend
wholly to prohibit private, voluntary affirmative action); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284-87 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing judgment of the Court) (Title
VI proscribes only those racial classifications that would violate equal protection clause).
Title IX, while in terms "sex-blind," was enacted with women in mind as the group
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Although enacted in 1975, the ADA is only now, four years later,
about to be fully implemented.1a It will apply predominantly, but not
exclusively, to the rapidly growing public sector.16 As discussed later,
the ADA, like Title VI and section 504 before it, may well require
far-reaching changes in the ways in which public and private agencies
conduct their activities: the age distribution of the populations they
serve; how they identify and communicate with clients; how and
where they render services; how and to what extent they collect in-
formation; and many other aspects of their operations.
However it may be interpreted and implemented, the ADA, like all
broad-ranging civil rights statutes, will generate much uncertainty and
litigation. Some uncertainty is inevitable and indeed appropriate-the
purpose of reform, after all, is to unsettle existing human and institu-
tional relationships and to generate new ones. Much of it, however,
derives from a conceptual ambivalence manifested in the statute it-
self. The ADA was premised upon a fundamental analogy between
race discrimination and age discrimination, an analogy whose in-
fluence pervades the legislative history of the ADA and finds ex-
pression in the use of a nondiscrimination provision drawn verbatim
from Title VI.'T Yet that prohibition was made subject to exceptions
and exclusions so broad that they arguably deprive the prohibition
of any significant effect.' 8 As discussed later, this ambivalence, so central
most requiring protection. The extent to which the ADA was intended to be "age-blind,"
however, remains uncertain. It seems unlikely that Congress intended to call into ques-
tion the validity of numerous statutes that prefer the interests of one age group over those
of others. See pp. 62-63 infra. On the other hand, Congress did intend to protect the
interests of all age groups, especially in the absence of any history of oppression of one
age group by another; here, as elsewhere, the analogy to race breaks down.
15. Implementation began pursuant to HEW's issuance of general governmentwide
regulations on June 12, 1979, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768-80 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 90), as required by the ADA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6103(a)(1) (West 1979). Regulations con-
sistent with those governmentwide regulations must next be issued by "each Federal
department or agency which extends Federal financial assistance to any program activity
by way of grant, entitlement, loan or contract other than a contract of insurance or
guaranty." Id. § 6103(a)(4).
16. HEW estimates that the ADA will apply to nearly 100,000 public and private
entities that receive federal financial assistance, and to as many as 450,000 sub-recipients
(that is, those who secure aid from the direct recipients). These entities range from
hospitals, schools, and mass transit systems to legal services offices, libraries, and housing
projects. The ADA also applies to private organizations, such as the Junior Chamber of
Commerce or senior citizens' clubs, if they directly or indirectly receive federal financial
assistance. See Memorandum from Office of Program Systems, HEW (Jan. 15, 1979)
(estimates of primary recipients) (memorandum on file with Yale Law Journal). The
estimate of sub-recipients was compiled by the Office of Civil Rights, HEW (1978).
17. See note 9 supra.
18. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1) (1976) (authorizing exception for any action that
"reasonably takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal operation ... of
[a] program or activity" or that makes a "differentiation .. . based upon reasonable
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to the impact of the ADA, was not even discussed, much less explained,
in its scant legislative history.19 Similarly, the phenomenon of age
discrimination in federally assisted activities was neither documented
nor even well-defined prior to enactment of the ADA.20 In short,
the ADA was premised upon an analogy that was explicitly affirmed,
implicitly denied, and nowhere analyzed.
B. The Substance of Policy: The Analogy Explored
The ADA's core provisions raise three critical policy issues that were
not considered by its authors: (1) The ways in which decisionmakers
use age to distinguish between people and the reasonableness of those
uses in light of their consequences and the social values they implicate;
(2) The reasonableness of the use of facially neutral factors other than
age with different age groups are thereby affected differently; and (3)
The burden of justification to which society is prepared to hold age
distinctions and uses of non-age factors. An analysis of these issues
suggests an appropriate conceptualization of the age discrimination
problem.
The Reasonableness of Using Age to Classify Persons. Existing law
is anything but "age-blind"; it employs age distinctions in numerous
contexts. Age is used as a proxy for, or as a predictor of, many charac-
teristics thought to be correlated with age.21 Thus, age is commonly
factors other than age"). It is instructive to compare the ADA with the ADEA, see note
12 supra, which contains several exceptions, two of which are closely related to two of
the ADA exceptions. 29 U.S.C. § 623(o (1976) (providing exceptions for "bona fide oc-
cupational qualification" and "reasonable factors other than age"); see pp. 66-71
infra (comparing exceptions). In addition, the ADEA authorized the creation of exceptions
by regulation. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1976). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see
note 12 supra, also contains a "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" exception.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976); see pp. 66-71 infra (discussing relevance to ADA excep-
tions). Title IX contains numerous exceptions, but each is quite narrow and specific.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). Indeed, many of the exceptions are absurdly specific. See,
e.g., id. § 1681(a)(8) (exception for father-son or mother-daughter activities); id. § 1681
(a)(9) (exception for scholarship awards in beauty pageants).
19. See pp. 46-49, 55-58 infra (legislative history of ADA and amendments). The
thin legislative record of the ADA contrasts sharply with the extensive record of Title
VI. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment of the Court) (describing Title Vi's legislative history as "volumi-
nous").
20. Cf. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 18-19 (1965) (age
discrimination in employment described as pervasive).
The contrast with race discrimination, the incidence of which has been well docu-
mented, is again striking. See, e.g., G. MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944) (examining
white-black relations in American society); U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL
DISORDERS, REPORT 95-113 (1968) (describing history of racism in America).
21. The characteristic for which age is intended to be a proxy is not always clear. In
extending transit-fare discounts to the elderly, for example, age may be considered a
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used as a measure of intellectual, physical, or emotional maturity (as in
minimum-age requirements for certain educational programs); of readi-
ness to assume adult responsibilities (as in minimum-age requirements
for voting, consuming alcohol, or possessing firearms); of the likelihood
of possessing certain risk factors (as in concentrating breast cancer
screening programs on women above a certain age); of certain physical
abilities (as in separating sports leagues by age); of the expected dura-
tion of future employability or service (as in concentrating job-training
programs on younger workers or limiting enrollment in medical schools
to persons under a certain age); or of the likelihood of experiencing
particular kinds of problems (as in medical programs that specialize
in serving certain age groups).
These classifications typically treat one age group differently than
another and frequently exclude one age group from a benefit al-
together.22 Because different groups may include individuals who are
alike in all relevant characteristics save age, applying such rules can
appear harsh and unjust to those individuals disadvantaged by them.
On the other hand, countervailing reasons-such as equitable or ad-
ministrative considerations-often militate in favor of such rules.
Ultimately, the reasonableness of any particular age classification must
rest upon the consequences of using such proxies or predictors in the
contexts in which they actually operate.
23
A rule containing an age criterion may be opposed on grounds both
of principle and of expediency. First, such a rule classifies individuals
proxy for low-income status and dependency upon mass transit. Age is clearly a very crude
proxy, however, for such characteristics. In fact, only one-seventh of the elderly have
incomes below the poverty threshold. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATIS-
TICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 472 (1978) (listing characteristics of persons 65 and
over) [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. This particular age classification may
actually reflect the political influence of the elderly relative to other low-income or transit-
dependent groups and the relative administrative simplicity of using age as the qualifying
characteristic.
22. An age criterion is perhaps the classic example of the "formally realizable rule"-
a criterion of decision whose applicability is readily ascertainable by the investigation of
relatively unambiguous, objective facts. The virtue of such a rule is certainty of applica-
tion; because little or no discretion is required to apply it to particular fact situations, it is
unlikely to be applied erroneously. See Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1687-1701 (1976) (exploring characteristics and moral
and jurisprudential underpinnings of formally realizable rules).
23. Cf. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical
Inference and Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE LJ. 1408, 1420-32 (1979) (contrasting
clinical and statistical decisionmaking). Professor Underwood examines the consequences
of employing different kinds of predictive processes and criteria. Age is often used as a
predictive criterion, as with the minimum drinking age, but is also used when prediction
of future behavior is not the purpose of the classification, as with the provision of Social
Security retirement benefits at designated ages. Age rules are employed not only as
auguries of future behavior but also as proxies for present capacities or attributes.
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on the basis of a characteristic that is immanent and inescapable to
them, one suggestive of neither culpability nor demerit. To disad-
vantage an individual solely because he or she possesses such a charac-
teristic offends deeply held notions of fairness; the attribute is, by
hypothesis, one over which the individual has no control and for
which he or she therefore cannot be held morally responsible.
24
Second, the use of age criteria will often reflect and reinforce stereo-
types about particular age groups that adversely affect the self-image of
members of that group and encourage others in society to behave as if
such generalizations were in fact accurate. The vice of such stereotypes
extends beyond the fact that they can become self-fulfilling proph-
ecies;2 r by imputing attributes to people solely on the basis of group
membership, they derogate from the uniqueness of individuals, often
producing factually inaccurate predictions in particular cases. Finally,
age criteria may be considered objectionable because they redound
to the disadvantage of groups, such as the elderly or children, whom
society believes deserving of special protection or concern, often in
the form of increased public benefits and services.
To each of these arguments against the use of age classifications, a
strong counterargument may be made in its favor. If being a particular
age, like being a particular race, is an immanent, inescapable attribute,
it is also one that each of us presumably has experienced or will ex-
perience; 26 members of other age groups are surely less likely to use
age rules to oppress persons whose status they have shared or expect
to share. Moreover, the fact that one cannot alter one's age is not
necessarily an argument against an age classification. It is one thing to
say that a classification stigmatizes or condemns, and quite another
to say that it places one at a disadvantage vis-a-vis others. Few, if
any, age classifications fall into the former category; rather, they
simply use age as a basis for allocating benefits between competing
claimants. Under these circumstances, it may well be that using an
immanent, impersonal characteristic such as age to determine one's
24. See Underwood, supra note 23, at 1436 (factors beyond individual's control threaten
autonomy and prevent individuals from improving their chances).
25. An example may illustrate the self-fulfilling nature of such stereotypes. Use of an
age ceiling in job programs will reduce job opportunities for the elderly, thereby rein-
forcing the view-in the minds of the elderly as well as of employers-that the elderly
are not employable or interested in working. For just such reasons, the Supreme Court
has denounced some sex classifications as reflective of "'old notions.'" Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975) (quoting decision below, 30 Utah 2d 315, 318, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012
(1974)).
26. See Underwood, supra note 23, at 1436 ("it may be important [in using age as a
criterion] that an individual is not bound to one age forever").
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entitlement to benefits is less stigmatizing or damaging than doing so
on the basis of a characteristic, such as maturity or employability, that
reflects directly upon one's personal merit.
27
Objection to age classifications on the ground that they reflect or
even reinforce stereotypes proves far too much, for it applies equally
to any broad classification of individuals. The rationality of any
classification depends primarily upon the extent to which the persons
so classified in fact possess the characteristic upon which the classifica-
tion is based. Almost inevitably, classifications embracing large popula-
tions will be "under-inclusive" or "over-inclusive." At some cost, it
will always be possible to obtain a better fit between the classificatory
means and the programmatic end by using the characteristic itself,
rather than the age-proxy, as the criterion for classification. In this
respect, age classifications do not differ, except perhaps in degree, from
those based upon other characteristics.28 The appropriate question in
every case, however, is not whether a classification is based upon a
stereotype or whether the classification effects a perfect fit; rather, the
question should be whether the disadvantages of an imperfect fit are
more than compensated for by the practical advantages of employing
the particular classification.
In the case of age classifications, these practical advantages are often
considerable. Age is a highly objective, easily measured characteristic,
especially when compared to those qualities, such as maturity or sus-
ceptibility to certain physical conditions, for which it often serves as a
proxy. Thus, age classifications can be administered more easily than
those dependent upon criteria that are difficult to measure directly or
that require individualized determinations.29 Furthermore, the relative
objectivity and ease of administration of age rules suggest that their
applicability, as distinguished from their reasonableness, will seldom
27. Cf. M. YOUNG, THE RISE OF THE MERITOCRACY 1870-2033 (1958) (suggesting that in
genuine meritocracy, those who fared poorly would feel greater despair because closer
correlation between status and personal deficiencies would aggravate stigma).
28. It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to say whether age classifications produce better
or worse fits than any of the other single-criterion classifications, such as education level,
place of residence, or marital status, that are employed in social legislation. All classifica-
tions will be imperfect to some degree.
29. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 657-59 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting social value of criteria that avoid need for individual determinations).
To the reduced administrative costs, of course, must be added the costs of the marginal
under- or over-inclusiveness of the age rule when compared with the better fitting, but
difficult to administer, classification that might be used instead of age. See Orr v. Orr,
99 S. Ct. 1102, 1112-13 (1979) ("even if sex were a reliable proxy for need" for financial
assistance, sex distinction would be invalid where individualized determinations would
cause no additional burden); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-204 (1976) (discussing
relationship between administrative convenience and use of sex-proxies).
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be controversial. 30 This constrained discretion constitutes an essential
safeguard not only against bias or arbitrariness in the application of
such rules but also against good faith bureaucratic error.
Another advantage in using age as a classificatory criterion is that
the immanence of age prevents individuals from manipulating it (as
they might, for example, their income). Thus, individuals are unlikely
to modify their behavior in response to the incentives created by the
age rule, and the consequences of using such rules will be relatively
predictable.
The final objection to the use of age rules-that they unfairly burden
certain groups-amounts to an assertion that those groups should
receive a different (and presumably greater) share of public resources
than they would enjoy in the absence of such rules. Such an assertion
can be neither refuted nor affirmed by recourse to any logical prin-
ciple or empirical datum. It is only fair to observe, however, that the
assertion that a particular group should receive more is rarely accom-
panied by an assertion that other groups should receive less, yet if
resources remain unchanged, the latter is the inevitable implication
of the former.31
For all of these reasons, a principle that age may never be employed
as a classificatory criterion seems impossible to justify. On the other
hand, it may well appear that a particular age classification is arbi-
trary and thus not supportable under the ADA's "reasonableness"
exceptions. As the preceding discussion suggests, however, such a judg-
ment would reflect more than an evaluation of the likely consequences
of using age as a criterion in that particular context; it would require
in addition a choice between ineluctably conflicting social values. 32
The Reasonableness of Using Non-Age Factors That Create Age-
Specific Differential Impacts. Typically, the criterion used to dis-
tinguish between people in the distribution of public benefits is not
age itself but some other facially neutral factor such as income. Where
the effect of using such a non-age factor is to advantage some age
groups over others, it could be argued-again, on an analogy to race
discrimination-that use of that factor constitutes prima facie age
discrimination. Such an argument, if accepted, would have far-reach-
ing implications. Such factors are numerous, reflecting the myriad
considerations used by legislators, program officials, and administrators
30. See Kennedy, supra note 22, at 1687-89 (such rules have virtues of certainty and
of restraining arbitrariness).
31. See p. 75 infra (discussion of "zero-sum game" aspect of ADA).
32. Cf. Underwood, supra note 23, at 1447-48 ("choice of factors, then, for use in
a predictive scheme implicates values that sometimes point in different directions").
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to target resources, define needs, restrict eligibility, and shape service
delivery patterns in particular social and political contexts. Most im-
portant, these factors almost certainly will generate different impacts
for different age groups. Each point in the life cycle tends to be as-
sociated with different distributions of non-age factors.3 Further-
more, the actual distribution of needs among age groups in any par-
ticular case may well be impossible to determine. 34 Thus, the un-
certain significance of "disproportionate impact" with respect to
33. Consider, for example, two fundamental program decisions: the benefit or service
to be provided, and the allocation of scarce resources among eligible persons. Many needs
that programs and activities attempt to address are more characteristic of some age
groups than of others: the need for the basic skills and socialization that public schools
provide is found far more commonly among children than among elderly people; the
need for the long-term health care that nursing homes provide is found far more fre-
quently among the elderly. Provision of any of these services will affect different age
groups differently.
It is difficult to conceive of a criterion for rationing limited program benefits among
a large pool of eligible persons-an imperative in most programs and activities subject to
the ADA-that would not have differential age-specific impacts. A means test or fee
schedule, for example, will disadvantage age groups that are on average less affluent (e.g.,
children, unemployed teenagers, the retired elderly). Age groups are not geographically
distributed in uniform fashion; thus, any facility-location criterion (e.g., convenience to
public transit) will tend to favor those age groups that live disproportionately in
proximate neighborhoods. Use of test scores may well disadvantage the elderly relative to
those more accustomed to test-taking. A first-come, first-served criterion will tend to favor
age groups that are more mobile and better informed about available benefits. Use of
waiting lines will tend to favor those age groups with more leisure time (e.g., the elderly)
over those who are fully employed (e.g., the middle-aged).
34. We cannot readily determine in an objective (as opposed to political) fashion
which age groups need which services or benefits in what amounts. Reliable data rarely
exist as to the relative desire of various age groups for the numerous age-specific pro-
grams or benefits, nor are so-called "needs assessments" valid or objective instruments for
developing such data. See Office of Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, U.S.
Dep't of HEW, Needs Assessment: A Critical Perspective (Dec. 1977) (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
Additional complications exist. One is the existence of age-specific programs, see, e.g.,
20 U.S.C. §§ 361-363 (1976) (services provided elderly readers); 42 U.S.C. § 1395o (1976) (age
65 eligibility for health insurance programs); of programs that, though not age-specific,
tend to focus on particular age groups, see, e.g., id. §§ 601-609 (Aid to Families with
Dependent Children); id. §§ 1396-1396j (Medicaid); and of private sector mechanisms, such
as private health insurance or veterans organizations, that provide similar services or
benefits to particular age groups. When these program interactions are taken into account,
the impossibility of determining objectively the extent to which, for example, the elderly
need and wish to participate in community health, employment, and other federal pro-
grams becomes even more evident. See pp. 51-52 infra. The difficulties do not end
there. Additional difficulties include the methodological problems that confront any
effort to draw inferences from age-specific correlations or from comparisons of participa-
tion with eligibility, see pp. 50-52 infra; the cost differentials of serving different age
groups, see note 221 infra; and the existence of other civil rights requirements directed
at characteristics other than age, see note 290 infra. See generally M. GUTOWSKI & J. KOSHEL,
METHODS FOR ASSESSING AGE DiScRIMINATION IN FEDERAL PROGRAMiS 5-11 (1977) (discussing
problems of defining such terms as discrimination on basis of program participation rates).
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race3  and sex 30 differentials is even more problematic with respect to
age group differentials.3 Unless virtually all facially neutral classifica-
tions are to become suspect, the use of non-age factors ought to enjoy
a very strong presumption of reasonableness notwithstanding the age-
specific differential impacts that inevitably ensue.3 8
The Burden of Justifying Age Classifications. In evaluating the
acceptability of age classifications and non-age factors having different
impacts upon different age groups, one must consider not only the
consequences of using them, but the motives that animated such uses.39
Because legislative motive is a notoriously elusive concept, 40 however,
inferences about motives and consequences must inevitably be drawn
from the political and social contexts in which these uses arise.
From this perspective, the use of age as a classificatory criterion en-
tails a far smaller risk of arbitrariness and oppression than the use of
race, alienage, or other criteria that have been held to exacting standards
by the courts.41 This is not to say, of course, that certain age groups are
never disadvantaged relative to others in the competition for scarce
social resources; political conflicts inevitably generate winners and
losers. It is only to say that age groups, unlike certain racial and ethnic
minorities, 42 do not come to that competition with any systematic
political disability or historical disadvantage that would justify regard-
ing the outcomes as a priori invidious, unreasonable, or suspect. 43
35. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 22, 239-45 (1976) (law or act not necessarily
unconstitutional solely because of racially disproportionate impact). See generally Fiss, A
Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 235, 290-310 (1971) (examining
difficulties of evaluating impact of facially innocent criteria).
36. See Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2291, 2296 (1979) (veterans-
preference statute not violative of equal protection because distinction drawn between
veterans and nonveterans was not pretext for gender discrimination); T. SOWELL, AEFIRMA-
TivE AcTIoN RECONSIDERED 23-34, 39 (1975) (explaining sex-specific differentials in faculty
hiring and pay practices as due to nondiscriminatory practices).
37. Given the paucity of age-specific data relative to race-specific and sex-specific data,
disproportionate impact may be even more difficult to establish in the case of age, quite
apart from differences in the impact of non-age criteria on people of different ages, sexes,
and races.
38. See pp. 77-80 infra; cf. Fiss, supra note 35, at 308-10 (arguing facially neutral
factors producing disproportionate racial impact should be invalidated only in exceptional
cases).
39. See Personnel Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2293 (1979) (though impact
provides important starting point, purposeful discrimination is what offends Constitution).
40. See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 208-21 (1962); Ely, Legislative and
Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1212 (1970).
41. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. Rlv. 5, 7-16 (1978) (analyzing judicial treatment of non-age classifica-
tions).
42. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976) (old age
does not define discrete and insular group in need of extraordinary protection).
43. For this reason, the constitutional standards for determining the validity of age
classifications are far more permissive than those based upon race. Compare Vance v.
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If age is indeed radically different from race as a basis for distinguish-
ing between people in the distribution of resources, and if the use of
non-age factors having disproportionate age-specific impacts is inescap-
able, then an appropriate conception of age discrimination must possess
distinctive contours that acknowledge both of these conditions. Such a
conception will necessarily be one of relatively limited reach, leaving
decisionmakers free to employ age distinctions and non-age criteria in
a wide variety of social choice contexts. If such a result seems difficult
to square with the rhetoric of reform in which Congress enveloped the
ADA, it remains one that the distinctive nature of age as a classificatory
characteristic requires.
C. The Form of Policy: Two Models of Group Protection
Broadly speaking, there are two distinctive statutory forms through
which the interests of discrete groups can be protected or advanced.
Each form proceeds from, or is implied by, a particular definition of
the problem to which the statutory policy is addressed; each form, in
turn, suggests certain consequences that the policy will tend to generate.
I shall call these forms the "nondiscrimination model" and the "alloca-
tive model."
The first, of which Title V144 is the purest example, is a command
to persons responsible for allocating resources or imposing rules that a
particular fact or attribute not be considered in making allocative or
regulatory decisions. The second, of which the Older Americans 
Act 40
is an example, is a command to such persons that they distribute
resources or impose rules according to particular criteria prescribed in
the law or to be developed by regulation. These criteria are often de-
fined in terms that affirmatively seek to relate the groups eligible to
receive benefits under the statute to the specific social problem or
condition that the statute purports to address.
4
6 What most clearly
distinguishes the nondiscrimination model from the allocative model
is the different attitude implicit in each toward the use of particular
Bradley, 99 S. Ct. 939 (1979) (upholding mandatory retirement age under rational basis
test) with Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell. J., an-
nouncing judgment of the Court) (racial distinctions inherently suspect and call for most
exacting judicial examination).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
45. Older Americans Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 219 (1965) (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3056(f) (1976)).
46. For example, the eligibility criteria for compensatory-education benefits involve
the family income or low educational achievement of a child, see 20 U.S.C. § 241c(c) (1976),
and the eligibility criteria for disability benefits involve income, duration of disability,
capacity for gainful employment, and the like, see 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976).
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attributes such as age to help shape social choice: the one, at least in
its purest "attribute-blind" form, is implacably opposed to such use;
the other embraces such a use as a means of defining needs and in-
forming the exercise of discretion.
The origins, features, and implications of each model as "ideal
types" are explored fully in Part IV. At this point, two observations
will suffice. First, the ADA evidently was conceived of as a hybrid
form: while its prohibition of discrimination employs the nondis-
crimination model, its reasonableness exceptions contemplate that
many allocative choices that take account of age may properly be
exercised by decisionmakers. Second, Congress fused the two models
without even addressing the fundamental tensions between them; in
doing so, it created a policy instrument of uncertain capacity, one
with potential for mischief.
II. The Political Context and Legislative History of the ADA
This Part begins by briefly tracing the growth in federal legislation
advancing the interests of the elderly during the decade preceding the
development of the ADA, and documents that the elderly by 1975
constituted a powerful and effective political force. The remainder
of Part II chronicles the remarkably scant legislative history of the
ADA, and analyzes the Civil Rights Commission report on age dis-
crimination. This analysis reveals that the principal policy-informing
organs-Congress, HEW, and the Civil Rights Commission-utterly
failed either to lay an adequate conceptual and empirical foundation
for the ADA or to consider its legal and policy implications.
A. The Historical and Political Background
The constitutional system of separation of powers, of checks and
balances, of fragmented institutions, and of decentralized sources of
power generates enormous political inertia.47 That inertia constitutes
the chief obstacle to the adoption of new, affirmative social policies.
Other political institutions and traditions, such as the party system,
patronage, logrolling, and interest groups, overcome this inertia by
aggregating disparate sources of power into majority support for new
policies. Enactment of such initiatives, however, usually has required
47. See, e.g., R. NEUSTADT, PRsMIDENTIAL POWER 33 (1960) (Constitution created govern-
ment of separated institutions sharing powers); Note, The Court-Appointed Special
Prosecutor: In Quest of a Constitutional Justification, 87 YALE L.J. 1692, 1696 n.21 (1978)
(discussing complexities of separation-of-powers question).
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some additional contextual ingredient: a pervasive economic crisis,'
4
an electoral landslide for the presidential party,49 a situation in which
well-organized interests can benefit through legislation or administra-
tive action imposing diffuse or concealed costs on the general public,
50
or the ability to define a problem in powerfully symbolic terms.
5 '
Several such ingredients combined in the case of the ADA to yield
a formidable, indeed irresistible, political offering: it promised bene-
fits to a visible, politically influential group that all Americans hoped
some day to join; its sponsors argued that it could confer these benefits
at no additional cost; its redistributional implications were not clear,
or at least were not noticed; and it was a small and inconspicuous part
of a large omnibus bill that both Congress and the administration
supported. Perhaps most important, it drew strength from the moral
legitimacy and rhetorical force of the civil rights movement of the
1960's and early 1970's, a provenance that is critical to understanding
how Congress conceptualized and responded to the problem of age
discrimination.
By 1975, the political foundation for the ADA had been laid. In
addition to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and
other federal civil rights laws,52 many states had adopted statutes
prohibiting age discrimination in employment,
5 3 housing, 4 credit,5
public accommodation,56 or education.
57 A White House Conference
on Aging, held in late 1971, had focused national attention on the
needs of the elderly and had recommended changes in governmental
policy toward the elderly.58 A torrent of exposes concerning execrable
48. See, e.g., J. BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE LION AND THE Fox 161-226 (1956) (examining
Roosevelt's leadership in Great Depression); A. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW
DEAL (1957) (same).
49. See D. KEARNS, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 212-50 (1976) (landslide
victory enabled Johnson to launch Great Society programs).
50. See Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE BUSINESS
PREDICAMENT 141-42 (J. McKie ed. 1974).
51. See M. EDELMAN, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964) (discussing role of symbols
in politics).
52. See p. 29 suPra (discussing civil rights statutes).
53. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2202 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-33-7A
(Supp. 1975).
54. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Cum. Supp. 1978); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-35 (1977).
55. E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4596 (1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.021
(Page 1977).
56. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 1976); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 291(2) (McKinney Supp.
1978).
57. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 1979); N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 291(2)
(McKinney Supp. 1978).
58. 1971 WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING, II FINAL REPORT: TOWARD A NATIONAL
POLICY ON AGING (recommending numerous changes in domestic policies affecting elderly).
See generally R. BUTLER, WHY SURVIVE? BrING OLD IN AMERICA 331-34 (1975) (critiquing
Conference).
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and often illegal conditions affecting large numbers of elderly people
flowed from Congress, state legislatures, and the media.5 9 Perhaps the
greatest force behind the development of the ADA, however, was the
acceleiation of a long-term demographic trend of great political, social,
and economic consequence-the steady aging of the American popula-
tion, 60 an increase in the number and proportion of elderly Americans
that is dwarfed by the growth rates estimated for the future.01
If the elderly constituted a powerful political force simply by virtue
of their numbers, 62 their real strength had additional sources in-
cluding, among other factors, the absence of any consistent opposi-
tion to their agenda, their ability to form political alliances, and a
strong public image of legitimacy stemming from their status and
broad distribution throughout all strata of society.63 As Peter Drucker
has observed, "[I]n sharp contrast to every other minority group, the
older population has a very large constituency outside its own ranks."04
The elderly translated their political power into a series of formi-
dable legislative achievements. 5 By 1975 their successes included Medi-
care and Medicaid, which together pay for over two-thirds of the
health-care costs of the elderly; 66 rapidly rising Social Security benefits
59. See, e.g., SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 93D & 94TH CONG., NURSING HOME CARE
IN THE UNITED STATES: FAILURE IN PUBLIC POLICY (introductory and supporting papers
no. 1-7) (COMM. PRINT 1974-76); R. BUTLER, supra note 58, at 103-38, 260-99.
60. In 1776, persons aged 65 or older comprised only 2% of the nation's population.
Brotman, The Aging of America, NAT'L J., Oct. 17, 1975, at 1622. Their share had doubled
to 4% by 1900, BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, I HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF
THE UNITED STATES 15 (1975), and reached 9.8% by 1970, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra
note 21, at 29. In mid-1977, the 23.5 million persons aged 65 or older comprised nearly
11% of the population. Id. at 472.
61. The 65-and-over group's share of the population is expected to exceed 14% by
1990, to increase to 15.6%7 in 2020, and to rise to more than 18%0 by 2025-a total of
nearly 55 million persons. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, su ra note 21, at 8-9.
62. Because the percentage of elderly persons who actually vote in elections generally
exceeds that of other age groups, the elderly population's impact on elections is even
greater than their percentage of the population. For example, persons 65 years and over
outvoted all age groups under 45 years (56%0 participation versus 53% for general popula-
tion) in the November 1978 congressional election. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION, 1978, at 17 (1979).
63. See H. PRATT, THE GRAY LOBBY 83-85 (1976); J. Tierney, The National Council of
Senior Citizens: From the Bingo Circuit to Political Action 29-31 (May 15, 1975) (un-
published manuscript on file with Yale Law Journal) (suggesting reasons for strength of
senior-citizens lobby).
64. P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 178 (1976). Drucker describes the impending
conflict between the economic claims of the elderly and those of other "deserving
minorities" and concludes that, "[i]f this clash were to be decided by voting power alone,
it would almost certainly be won by the older people. With their support among the
middle-aged at work, they could marshal by themselves a near-majority of the voting
population." Id. at 181.
65. See H. PRATT, supra note 63, at 1-2.
66. Brotman, supra note 60, at 1627.
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indexed against inflation; 7 the Supplementary Security Income pro-
gram 8 which established a minimum federal income for the elderly,
blind, and disabled and also is indexed against inflation; s0 special
housing programs; 70 pension reform; 7' the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act of 1967;72 and preferential tax treatment.73 Another
example of the political effectiveness of the elderly is the extraordinary
growth in appropriations under the Older Americans Act of 1965.
74
The Act, which authorizes a pastiche of grant programs for services,
planning, research, and training, was implemented by appropriations
that mushroomed from $7.5 million in 1966 to $245 million in 1975. 75
Between 1975 and 1978, the total nearly trebled, reaching $696.4
million.70 As one observer recently noted, "the aging have proved a
difficult group for officials to ignore or 'buy off' with purely symbolic
concessions."
77
B. Legislative History of the 1975 ADA
When the Older Americans Act came up for reauthorization before
a subcommittee of the House Education and Labor Committee early
in 1975, the subject of age discrimination was not on the agenda. In-
deed, the subject was mentioned only once during the hearings-and
then almost in passing-when Arthur S. Flemming, the influential
HEW Commissioner on Aging,78 testified. Responding to a general
67. Between August 1965 and August 1978, the average monthly Social Security benefit
awarded to a married worker retiring at age 65 increased from $123.21 to $406.51, an
increase of 230%. SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN, December 1978, Table M-13, at 43. During
the same period, the consumer price index increased by slightly more than 100%.
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR MONTHLY LABOR REVIEw, August 1979,
at 89.
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383 (1976).
69. Id. § 1382f.
70. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1715V (1976) (providing federal mortgage insurance for housing
for elderly). The elderly also benefit disproportionately from the low-rent public housing
program. See GUTOWSK & KOsnELL, supra note 34, at 41-61.
71. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat.
829 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29 U.S.C. (1976)) (protecting employee
benefits).
72. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
73. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 37 (retirement income credit); id. § 121 (reduced tax on gain
from sale or exchange of residence of elderly individual).
74. Pub. L. No. 89-73, 79 Stat. 219 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3056f (1976)).
75. See S. RP. No. 255, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1975), reprinted in Part in [1975] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1252, 1255 [hereinafter cited as S. RE. No. 255 with citations to
pages in original Report].
76. See S. REP. No. 855, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978) (listing appropriations under
Older Americans Act).
77. H. PRATT, supra note 63, at 83.
78. Dr. Flemming was then also Chairman of the United States Commission on Civil
Rights and had been Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in the 1950's. One
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question, Flemming denounced "ageism," equating it with "racism"
and "sexism," 7 and expressed the "hope that the day will come when
the Civil Rights Act will be amended to include age ... as one of the
factors that must be taken into consideration under the Civil Rights
Act." 0
Dr. Flemming's suggestion fell on fertile soil. Bills quickly were
introduced in both the House and Senate8l to amend the Older
Americans Act to prohibit discrimination on the basis of age in
federally assisted programs, subject to several broad exceptions.8 2 The
House committee reported the bill on March 14, 1975, but apart from
some rhetorical flourishes the report was silent on the meaning of the
bill's vague language.
83
Throughout this period, the Administration was not asked for its
views on the age discrimination legislation.8 4 Desperate to slow the
student of the political achievements of the "modern senior movement" has underscored
Flemming's role: "Flemming's extraordinary stature cannot be emphasized too strongly.
One would have difficulty naming another subcabinet level official whose influence ex-
tended into the Oval Office of the White House and who has been in a position, as is
reliably reported, to more than once head off a threatened veto by contacting the
President directly." H. PRATr, supra note 63, at 217.
79. The term "ageism" apparently had been coined by Dr. Robert Butler. See R.
BUTLER, supra note 58, at 11.
80. HousE REPORT, supra note 13, at 15.
81. See S. 1425, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (introduced March 17), summarized in S.
REP. No. 255, supra note 75, at 1; H.R. 3922, 94th Cong., 1st Sem., reprinted in 121 CONG.
Rac. 9204-10 (1975) (introduced Feb. 27). The bills apparently were drafted by the sub-
committee staff. Telephone interview with Stephen Kurzman, former Assistant HEW
Secretary for Legislation (May 29, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
82. The principal exceptions appeared in H.R. 3922, 94th Cong., Ist Sess., § 303(b),
reprinted in 121 CONG. REc. 9204-10 (1975).
83. In its report, the committee simply shared Dr. Flemming's wish "for the nation to
combat ageism," asserting that "[n]on-involvement of older persons is traceable time and
again . . . to a determination by the leaders of many institutions in our society to
discriminate against persons as workers and as volunteers solely because they have reached
a given age. They refuse to consider the merits of each case. In so doing they reflect...
a deep-seated prejudice against the elderly." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 13, at 15. The
Report contended that older persons had not been provided "services which we believe
other age groups are entitled to as a matter of right," that the elderly had not received
"their fair share of services in such areas as health and transportation," and that "[i]t is
clear . . . that discrimination against older persons is still widespread." Id. at 15-16. The
Report cited no evidence to support its allegations of pervasive age discrimination.
84. Dr. Flemming's earlier remarks, having been made in response to a question
rather than in prepared testimony, had not been cleared by HEW and could not have
represented the Administration's position. The lack of clearance was evident from sub-
sequent department efforts to head off the legislation, see pp. 44-47 infra, and was
confirmed by the official then responsible for securing HEW clearance of testimony,
Telephone interview with Stephen Kurzman, supra note 81. Reflecting the Administration's
concern over the lack of input, HEW Secretary Weinberger, whose department's programs
would be most affected by the bill, wrote House Minority Leader John Rhodes on March
20 to complain that HEW had not been given an opportunity to address the age dis-
crimination issue during the hearings. Letter from Caspar IV. Weinberger to John Rhodes
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 27, 1979
legislative juggernaut, HEW representatives met with subcommittee
Chairman John Brademas and his staff to urge caution and to de-
termine what had prompted the committee action, but were un-
ceremoniously rebuffedsa Debate on the bill contained virtually no
discussion of the age discrimination provisions, 0 and H.R. 3922, with
the age discrimination section unchanged, passed the House.87
Having been ignored and then rebuffed in the House, HEW
turned its attention to the Senate, where hearings had barely touched
upon the age discrimination provisions.88 In a May 9 letter to the
Senate committee overseeing the bill, the department urged that
"Congress not act precipitously"8 9 but instead seek more information
(March 20, 1975), reprinted in 121 CONC. REc. 7915-16 (1975). Weinberger suggested that
the committee bill raised a number of problems and urged that before taking further
action, the committee refer the age discrimination issue to the Federal Council on Aging
for its consideration. Id.
85. HEW officials were told that Dr. Flemming had asked for the legislation. When
they asked what evidence of discrimination justified such action, they were told only that
a number of medical schools barred older persons from applying. Telephone interview
with Stephen Kurzman, supra note 81.
86. Only two congressmen ever addressed the meaning of the age discrimination
legislation. Congressman Brademas repeated almost verbatim the committee report
language, noting with approval Dr. Flemming's assertion that ageism is as great a problem
as racism or sexism. 121 CONG. REC. 9212 (1975). He then noted the effect of the ADA on
mandatory retirement plans and apprenticeship programs. Id. Congressman Quie provided
the only other comment. See 121 CONG. REc. 37,299 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Quie) (in-
terpreting statutory exceptions to allow what amount to cost effectiveness concerns to
affect legal rights under ADA).
87. 121 CONG. REc. 9251 (1975). The bill passed under the "suspension of the rules"
procedure, usually reserved for noncontroversial legislation.
88. The only extended discussion of age discrimination arose in testimony by Dr.
Flemming. He contended that the elderly were underrepresented in a variety of federally
assisted programs, citing in support comparisons of the program participation rates of
those over age 65 with their share of the general population in the program's service
area. He reiterated the statement that he made in the House hearings, that there was a
need to combat ageism through civil rights legislation. See Legislation to Extend the
Older Americans Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aging of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare on S. 1425 94th Cong., Ist Sass. 390-91, 396-98 (1975) (testimony
of Arthur S. Flemming) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Hearings]. A brief colloquy also
occurred regarding application of the ADA to age-limited medical school admissions
policies.
Several other witnesses addressed age discrimination provisions, but only briefly. One
urged that the exceptions provisions be eliminated entirely. Id. at 403 (testimony of Cyril
F. Brickfield). Another urged that the protections of the bill extend only to the elderly.
Id. at 486, 507 (testimony of Jack Ossofsky). A third urged that only the exception for
programs or activities "established under authority of any law" be retained. Id. at 561-62
(testimony of Richard Hamilton). Two other witnesses, Senators Church and Bentsen,
merely indicated general support for the age discrimination provisions. Id. at 375 (state-
ment of Sen. Church); id. at 377 (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
89. The letter noted that a preliminary review had indicated the bill "would raise
administrative issues and questions similar to those raised by Title IX," and pleaded for
more time to explore the bill's "potential ramifications." Letter from Stephen Kurzman
to Harrison A. Williams, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare (May
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from affected agencies. A month later, however, the Senate subcom-
mittee approved a bill almost identical to the bill that passed the
House. 90 HEW Secretary Caspar Weinberger then wrote the full com-
mittee to "expand upon" his May 9 letter.91 Again stressing that the
House bill raised many complex issues, he warned that it "would
leave to the Executive Branch . . .momentous policy decisions in
wholly uncharted areas without the benefit of any specific legislative
guidance."9 2 Focusing upon the exceptions in the House bill, which
spoke in terms of "reasonable" uses of age and "reasonable" factors
other than age, the Secretary posed a series of questions about their
meaning,93 questions to which Congress never responded.
The Secretary's warning found a responsive audience in the Senate
committee. When the committee reported its bill to the floor on June
25, the age discrimination title did not contain the nondiscrimination
provision that the subcommittee and the House had approved.94 In-
9, 1975), reprinted in S. REP. No. 255, supra note 75, at 35-37. The Department of
Transportation wrote the committee to concur in HEN's position. Letter from Rodney
E. Eyster, General Counsel, Dep't of Transportation, to Harrison A. Williams (May 8,
1975), reprinted in id. at 41-43.
90. S. Rap. No. 255, supra note 75, at 13. The only significant change made by the
Senate subcommittee was inclusion of a specific exemption for any employment practices
subject to the ADEA.
91. Letter from Caspar W. Weinberger to Harrison A. Williams (June 18, 1975), re-
printed in id. at 37.
92. Id.
93. Weinberger stated:
Neither the bill nor its legislative history indicates what factors would be "reason-
able." Even a very preliminary review of the potential ramifications suggests a myriad
of unexplored issues such as the following:
Is it "reasonable" for school systems to exclude three-year-olds from kindergarten
classes? Or eleven-year-olds from high school classes?
Can a medical or dental school bar a 50-year-old person from taking one of its
limited classroom seats because his or her life expectancy suggests a practice of
relatively brief duration?
It is "reasonable" to limit reduced-fare or free public transportation to those age
65 or over?
Can existing guaranteed housing loans and senior citizen housing programs be
limited to specific age groups?
At what age would a person be deemed to be sufficiently mature to consent to
sterilization, to receive family planning information or to elect specific medical
treatment?
Id. at 37-38. Weinberger closed with a renewed plea for "a reasonable interval to explore
and resolve such issues as I have outlined above before formulating an Age Discrimina-
tion Act." Id.
94. On the Senate floor, Senator Eagleton explained that the committee had been
influenced by "the seriousness of the concerns expressed" in Secretary Weinberger's letter.
121 CONG. Rac. 21,172 (1975). Senator Beall added that "the committee did not feel that
a sufficient body of data was available for us to adequately structure effective legislation
to address this problem. The I-year study by the Civil Rights Commission should remedy
this situation and enable us to address ourselves to this pressing social problem." Id. at
21,174.
The Yale Law Journal
stead the bill mandated a one-year study of age discrimination by the
U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. 95 The committee explained why it
wanted to defer age discrimination legislation until the study's com-
pletion:
When the results of the Commission's study are available, the
Congress will have for the first time a thorough analysis of the
causes, scope, nature, and extent of age discrimination in federally
assisted programs. At that time, the need for additional legislation
on this subject can be fairly and reasonably assessed.90
The Senate passed the amended bill, and a conference with the House
on the age discrimination provision ensued.
97
In October 1975, with the congressional session drawing to a close
and a presidential election year approaching, the conference on the
Older Americans Act Amendments remained deadlocked. Anxious to
reach some accommodation that would reauthorize the department's
programs but reluctant to complicate delicate negotiations being con-
ducted within a Congress not notably friendly to the Administration,
HEW officials informally circulated to the conference committee staff
an internal HEW memorandum analyzing a conference draft bill that
combined the House bill with a mandate for a Civil Rights Com-
mission study.98
This memorandum discussed issues raised by the conference draft,
especially the extreme ambiguity of the exceptions and the lack of
direction given the Commission for its study of age discrimination.
The memorandum suggested that enumerating specific activities in-
tended to be rendered illegal might be a more sensible approach, but
acknowledged that it probably was impractical "at this late date, and in
Conference."99 It concluded by reemphasizing the difficulty of predict-
ing what the sweeping but vague prohibition on age discrimination
("this potential nightmare") 100 might mean in practice. Other than the
95. See S. REP. No. 255, sugra note 75, at 31.
96. Id. at 32.
97. See 121 CONG. REC. 21,833 (1975); cf. id. at 37,735 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton) ("The
effort to resolve the difficult issues posed by the age discrimination provisions of the
House bill was responsible for the delay of several months in reaching agreement on the
entire bill in conference. All other disputed issues were settled last July.")
98. See Memorandum from Ira Goldstein to Bill Morrill, HEW Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation (Oct. 25, 1975) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [hereinafter
cited as Memorandum]. This memorandum was the first, and apparently only, analysis
by HEW staff of the program and policy implications of the ADA. Telephone interview
with Bill Morrill (May 9, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
99. Memorandum, supra note 98, at 11.
100. Id.
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Weinberger letters (which only raised questions and urged caution)
and several meetings between HEW officials and committee personnel
(which avoided specifics), this internal memorandum-written hastily
and under the constraint of a fait accompli-constituted the only
substantive contribution that the Executive Branch, which alone
possessed the detailed knowledge of program operations needed to in-
form the debate, was to make to the design of the original Act.
When the conference report was filed on November 17, it was clear
that the House had prevailed: the age discrimination study mandated
by the Senate bill was included, but it would be conducted after the
ADA had been enacted into law (although prior to its effective date).101
Legislation was not to be deferred during the pendency of the Com-
mission's study, but the significance of the study "to a final resolution
by the Congress of the difficult policy issues that are left undecided
by this legislation" was emphasized. 10 2
101. The conference substitute-which became the ADA of 1975-made six notable
changes in the House bill. First, it made clear that the bill was intended to prohibit only
"unreasonable" age discrimination, a change that clarified little. The Conference Report
noted that this meaning was already implicit in the exceptions, which constitute "con-
siderations of reasonableness." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 56 ("there is not a
clear consensus among the conferees" on what uses of age would be reasonable). The
mandate to the Civil Rights Commission also was altered to require a study of "unreason-
able age discrimination." Id. at 57. Second, the exception for any action that "reasonably
takes into account age as a factor necessary to the normal operation" of a federally
assisted program was expanded by adding the clause "or to the achievement of any
statutory objective of such program or activity." 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (1976). The
Conference Report stated only that this change was intended "to clarify congressional
intent." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 58. Third, the exclusion for any pro-
gram "established under authority of any law" that provides age-conditioned benefits
was expanded. The change included in the exclusion those programs for which
participation was prescribed in age-related terms, such as "older Americans, "elderly,"
or "children." 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1976).
Fourth, the exclusion of employment practices was clarified. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra
note 9, at 58. This provision is now codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c) (1976). Fifth, the
conference deleted both the authority of the Attorney General to bring "pattern or
practice" actions and the private cause of action contained in the House bill, providing
instead that fund termination and other means available to the federal agencies to en-
force their regulations would be the exclusive remedy under the ADA. CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 57. A private cause of action was added to the ADA in the 1978
Amendments. Finally, the conference prescribed a schedule for the Civil Rights Commis-
sion study, the issuance of general, governmentwide regulations by HEW, and the
issuance of agency-specific regulations by each federal department. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)
(1976). In the 1978 amendments, the prior effective date was changed from January 1,
1979, to July 1, 1979. The schedule was designed so that the Commission's study, the
agency responses to it, and any proposed regulations could be considered in 1978, when
the Older Americans Act would again be up for reauthorization. CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 9, at 57. The conference also provided more direction for the Civil Rights
Commission study, prescribing general procedures to be observed and issues to be ad-
dressed. Many of these specifications had been suggested in the internal HEW
memorandum of October 25. See Memorandum, supra note 98, at 7-10.
102. CONFERENCE REPORT, suPra note 9, at 59.
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The House debate on the conference report was perfunctory and
only two remarks are of interest: Congressman Brademas's assurance
that the ADA could provide "substantial additional services and
benefits to the elderly without establishing a single new program or
requiring additional program funding,1 03 and Congressman Quie's
interpretation of the statutory exceptions to permit what amount to
cost effectiveness considerations to affect legal rights under the ADA,
10 4
an issue that remains central in interpreting the Act. 0 5 Senate debate
on the conference report was equally desultory, with one important
exception: Senator Eagleton posed several fundamental questions about
the meaning or possible implications of the ADA, 10 6 questions that
appear nowhere else in the entire legislative history of the Act and
that were never answered. Despite his misgivings, however, Eagleton
"reluctantly" supported the conference report.'07 He and others did
so on the premise that although "the evidence and background data
were lacking to make effective supportable decisions in this very com-
plicated area,"'10 the forthcoming Commission study would fill this
void by alerting Congress to imperfections in the statute. Indeed, this
consideration was vital to the conference compromise, as the conference
report makes clear' 0 9 and as the President stated upon signing the
103. See 121 CONG. REc. 37,297 (1975).
104. Id. at 37,299 (1975). Representative Quie also pointed out that the bill had been
amended to reject the "infection theory," under which discrimination in activities not
receiving federal funds could be reached so long as the entity received federal assistance
for some activity. Id.
105. See pp. 70-79 infra.
106. Addressing his colleagues, Senator Eagleton said:
I could never get satisfactory answers to certain fundamental questions, such as:
"Which programs? In what numbers? Who decides what age discrimination is un-
reasonable?"
This last question of reasonableness is of the utmost importance, Mr. President,
for unlike race discrimination, age discrimination is not per se arbitrary. Our laws
commonly make distinctions among individuals based upon their age, often for the
purpose of defining those eligible for a particular kind of Government benefit, such
as social security, or for describing the target group for a particular piece of legisla-
tion, just as this bill is designed to aid older Americans. So it is not all age discrimina-
tion that we want to prohibit, but only that which is unreasonable.
And what is unreasonable age discrimination? Whatever it is cannot be determined
from the bill, for it simply prohibits "unreasonable age discrimination" and tosses
the ball to the executive branch to determine what is reasonable and unreasonable.
121 CONG. REC. 37,735 (1975). Senator Cranston echoed Eagleton's concern about the lack
of evidence to support the ADA, but his remarks were more general. See id. at 37,748.
107. See id. at 37,735 (remarks of Sen. Eagleton). He did so only because agreement
was essential to prevent expiration of the Older Americans Act programs, the Civil Rights
Commission study might "provide guidance on the policy issues left unresolved," and
Congress would have an opportunity to review regulations under the ADA before they
became effective. See id.
108. See id. at 37,748 (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
109. See CONFEREN E REPORT, sutra note 9, at 59.
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legislation.110 In any event, the compromise had the intended effect;
the Older Americans Act Amendments of 1975, containing the ADA,
quickly passed both chambers"' and was signed into law. During the
entire legislative journey of the ADA, only one legislator, Senator
Eagleton, had bothered to raise important questions about its meaning.
C. The Civil Rights Commission Report on Age Discrimination
If Congress counted on the Civil Rights Commission's study to
provide persuasive evidence post hoc for its decision to enact a statute
that it had not troubled to think much about, it had reason to be
disappointed when the Commission released its study in January
1978.112 The study and recommendations are important, however, for
three reasons. First, the study remains the only one purporting to
address the nature and extent of age discrimination in a wide range of
federally assisted activities. 1 3 Second, Congress had stressed that the
study would be "essential to a final resolution by the Congress of the
difficult policy issues that are left undecided by this legislation.""114 In
fact, the House held hearings on the Commission's report as soon as
it was released, and adopted its most far-reaching recommendation-
the elimination of the reasonableness exceptions. Although this recom-
mendation was deleted in conference, other Commission recommenda-
tions were actually enacted. Third, the Commission report, because
it implicitly and unqualifiedly adopted the analogy to race discrimina-
tion and apparently influenced Congress, contributed significantly to
the conceptual confusion that continues to underlie the ADA.
The Commission study began by devising an extraordinarily broad
definition of age discrimination-"any act or failure to act, or any
law or policy that adversely affects an individual on the basis of
age."11 r, This definition suffered from at least two crucial flaws.
First, it lacked the basic attribute of a definition-boundaries. Virtually
110. 11 WEEKLY Comp. OF Pars. Doc. 1326 (Dec. 1, 1975). President Ford was dismayed
that "[t]he delineation of what constitutes unreasonable age discrimination is so imprecise
that it gives little guidance in the development of regulations to prohibit such dis-
crimination." Id. He expressed hope that the Commission study would permit "these
issues to be discussed thoroughly." Id. at 1327.
111. See 121 CONG. REc. 37,301, 37,752-53 (1975) (conference report passed House 404 to
6 and Senate 89 to 0).
112. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, I THE AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY (1977) [herein-
after cited as I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY].
113. The study by Gutowski and Koshel examined only two federal programs. M.
GUTOWSKI & J. KOSHEL, supra note 34, at 11-61.
114. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 59.
115. I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 2. Although it described this
definition as "tentative," id., the Commission has never revised that definition.
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any action by any recipient of federal assistance will affect different age
groups differently and thus affect some of them adversely "on the basis
of age."" 6 Second, it ignored the ADA itself and the limiting concepts
embedded in the statutory scheme. The Commission's definition, un-
like that implicit in the ADA, elided any notion of reasonableness," 7
any concession to the "normal operation" of a program or the "ob-
jective" of a statute,"Is or any recognition of the difference between
an "action" and a "failure to act.''''0 Proceeding from this essentially
all-inclusive definition of age discrimination, the Commission con-
cluded that in each of the ten federal programs studied,' 20 such
discrimination was "widespread,' ' 12' that "persons aged 65 or over are
consistently adversely affected,"' 122 and that "reasons offered by ad-
ministrators to justify their policies and practices are not acceptable."
23
Because the Commission's analysis of age discrimination in the Com-
munity Mental Health Centers (CMHC) program is typical of its
analyses of the other programs, and because the Commission regarded
the CMHC program as "one of the most glaring examples" of age
discrimination,124 that analysis merits closer scrutiny.
Commission's Analysis of the Community Mental Health Centers
Program. The Commission's conclusion regarding the CMHC pro-
gram was a product of essentially the following chain of reasoning:
(A) Although 9.9% of the population in 328 CMHC service areas dur-
ing 1975 were 65 years of age or older, only 4.1% of the new patients
at those CMHC's were in the 65-or-over age group; -'25 similarly, only
5% of staff hours for CMHC consultation and education were directed
116. See note 33 supra (giving examples of such programs).
117. See 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b) (1976) (setting out reasonableness exception).
118. See id. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (defining reasonableness in part by these terms).
119. See id. § 6103(b) (referring to "any action otherwise prohibited by the provisions
of section 6102").
120. The programs were the Community Mental Health Center program, the Legal
Services program, the Vocational Rehabilitation Basic Grants program, the Community
Health Centers program, the Title XX Social Services program, the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act program, the Food Stamp program, the Medicaid program,
the Vocational Education basic grants program, and the Adult Basic Education program.
The Commission also studied admissions policies for higher educational institutions. See
I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 3-4.
121. Id. at 2.
122. Id.
123. Id. In reaching its judgment, the Commission had available a report, prepared
under a Commission contract, that was concerned exclusively with the problems that a
broad definition would create. See M. GuTowsKi & J. KOSHEL, supra note 34, at 5-10. The
report and its warnings were apparently ignored by the Commission. See U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, II THE AGE DISCRIINATION STUDY 2-13 (1979) (describing study's
methodology) [hereinafter cited as II AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY].
124. I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 6.
125. Id. at 7.
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to agencies dealing with older persons;126 (B) Some studies show that
the elderly experience certain mental problems at a higher rate than
certain other age groups;'127 (C) Some mental health professionals
reportedly preferred to work with younger patients; 12  there was often
a shortage of staff specially trained to serve the elderly; 129 special out-
reach efforts to the elderly were often inadequate; 130 and some centers
in allocating resources among age groups took into account that the
elderly had access to other mental health services.' 3 ' Therefore, (D)
the CMHC program discriminated on the basis of age. 132
The Commission recognized in its follow-up volume, issued one
year later, that a methodology essentially comparing gross program
participation rates for various age groups against that group's share
of the total population in the service area could not, without more,
support a finding of discrimination. 33 Yet in its more highly pub-
licized initial report, that was precisely the method employed. No-
where did the Commission define critical concepts, such as "under-
represented" or "need for services." In no instance did it discuss any
factor other than discrimination that might explain the "underrepre-
sentation." Given its all-inclusive definition of age discrimination, 34
of course, these omissions are not surprising: any factor that might
explain the "underrepresentation" of the elderly also would fall within
its definition of age discrimination.
Setting aside the Commission report, however, it would appear that
several factors, taken singly or in combination, are fully adequate to
explain this "underrepresentation" without resort to a finding of
discrimination; none would fall within any definition of age discrimi-
nation that was consistent with the provisions of the ADA. First, the
Medicare program, the principal source of payment for the health care
received by the elderly, does not accord provider status to CMHC's
and thus does not reimburse patients for most CMHC services.' 35 The
126. Id.
127. R. BUTLER, supra note 58, at 227 ("those over age 65 are the most susceptible to
mental illness"). Butler perceived widespread age discrimination in the mental health
field. Id. at 225-59.
128. I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 36-37; cf. II AGE DISCRIMINATION
STUDY, supra note 123, at 84, 98-100 (using similar reasoning to arrive at same conclusion
regarding CMHC services to children under 15).
129. I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 37.
130. Id. at 27-30.
131. Id. at 35-36.
132. Id. at 6.
133. I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 123, at 6.
134. See pp. 49-50 supra.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (1976) (defining provider of services as hospital, skilled
nursing facility, home health agency or fund); Sharfstein, Will Community Mental Health
Survive in the 1980's? 135 AM. J. PsYCH. 1365, 1369 (1978) (no CMHC's are certified as
providers under Medicare and many are excluded under Medicaid).
The Yale Law Journal
same is true of most private insurance programs.' 3 6 These coverage
limitations reflect a widespread restriction on reimbursement of mental
health services in general and outpatient services in particular, 137 one
that may well constitute unwise public policy.' 38 But surely it is a re-
striction that falls well outside any definition of age discrimination that
is not simply coterminous with "disproportionate impact."
Second, the elderly are notoriously reluctant to use mental health
services voluntarily, a reluctance that contrasts with their high utiliza-
tion of other medical services' 39 and that appears to persist even when
broad outpatient benefits are available. 40 Many of these factors are
regrettable, some are not limited to the elderly, and some may even
be remediable. Nevertheless, they cannot-with the possible exception
of the preference of some providers for younger patients-reasonably
be described as age discrimination.
The Commission's Recommendations. The Commission report re-
garded as age discrimination every policy, practice, action, or inaction
that appeared to be correlated with a less than "fair share' ' 14 ' of services
136. L. REED, HEALTH INSURANCE AND PSYCHIATRIC CARE (1972). On the other hand,
Medicare and Medicaid do reimburse for inpatient services in mental hospitals, psychiatric
wards of general hospitals, and nursing homes. Thus, while the elderly may be "under-
represented" in CMHC's, they are probably "over-represented" in mental hospitals and
nursing homes.
Under Medicaid, states have the option of covering persons over age 65, but not persons
between the ages of 22 and 64, for care rendered in mental institutions, including
hospitals and nursing homes. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10) (1976). As of early 1979, 41 states
had exercised that option. Telephone interview with Morton Albert, M.D., Acting Director,
Division of Mental Health Service Programs (March 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law
journal).
137. Sharfstein, supra note 135, at 1367-69.
138. For a survey of arguments on both sides of the issue, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEW,
REPORT REQUIRED BY P.L. 95-210 ON THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF EXTENDING
MEDICARE COVERAGE TO MENTAL HEALTH, ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE CENTER (1978) [here-
inafter cited as HEW REPORT].
139. See Goldensohn, Cost, Utilization, and Utilization Review of Mental Health
Services in a Prepaid Group Practice Plan, 134 AM. J. PSYCH. 1223 (1977).
140. See Hustead and Sharfstein, Utilization and Cost of Mental Illness Coverage in
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program, 1973, 135 AM. J. PSYCH. 315 (1978). Ac-
cording to one gerontologist, this resistance extends to social services generally. R.
BUTLER, supra note 58, at 165-67. Researchers attribute this reluctance to a variety of
factors in addition to the economic one: the stigma that often attaches to mental ill-
ness, mistrust by the elderly of mental health professionals, a tendency of the elderly
to define problems in physical rather than psychological terms, preference for emo-
tional support from family, clergy, or senior citizens groups, lack of transportation, limita-
tions on mobility, fear of visiting new settings, language differences between the elderly
and many CMHC staff, and a preference by some mental health providers for better
educated, therapeutically promising, and middle-class patients. See id. at 229; HEW
REPORT, supra note 138, at 28-31 (citing research studies).
141. Although "fair share" is never defined, the Commission report implicitly employs
this definition throughout and explicitly adopts it as the performance goal for affirmative
action. See I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 46-47; II AGE DISCRIMINATION
Vol. 89: 27, 1979
Age Discrimination
for the elderly. Although this approach begs all of the important
questions-for example, questions of differing needs among different
age groups, of defining the service appropriately, of causality, and of
intent-the Commission report used this bluntest of analytical instru-
ments to strike at a welter of policies and practices that it felt did not
adequately serve the elderly.'142 Yet almost all of these appear to be bona
fide (albeit flawed and often ineffective) efforts by decisionmakers to
accommodate conflicting policy objectives to limited resources, rather
than instances of age discrimination.
Armed with its indictment, the Commission report proceeded to
recommend sweeping amendments to the still-unimplemented ADA.'
143
While most of the suggested changes were not major, the Commission's
first and most important recommendation certainly was:' 44 in order to
expand the sweep of the ADA, the Commission would amend the
statute's statement of purpose to prohibit all age discrimination and
not merely "unreasonable" discrimination, eliminate all "reasonable-
ness" exceptions and the "any law" exclusion, and permit only two
narrow exceptions to the flat prohibition against age discrimination. 45
This recommendation could hardly have been more far-reaching. It
would vastly broaden the limited definition of age discrimination im-
plicit in the exceptions and exclusions of the ADA, thereby ignoring
most of the differences between age and race as a basis for classification.
Among the laws, policies, and practices that might well fall to the
Commission's meat-axe were: minimum age laws for obtaining a driver's
STUDY, supra note 123, at 5-6. While the Commission recognized that in theory "explana-
tions or reasons for the existence of disparities" might invalidate this definition, id. at 6,
it failed to discuss such explanations or reasons. For additional complications that arise
from application of such a concept to the elderly, see pp. 32-37, 51-52 supra and especially
notes 33 & 34 supra.
142. Singled out as examples of discrimination were the emphasis in some health
programs on preventive health care for children, youth, and pregnant women, I AGE
DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 15-16; the emphasis in the Vocational Rehabilita-
tion program on placement in competitive employment, id. at 16-17; the emphasis in some
states' social service programs on protective services for children and families, id. at 21-22;
and similar judgments as to program priorities.
143. Id. at 44-51.
144. See id. at 41-44.
145. Id. at 44. The exceptions would be for any action "specifically directed or
provided by the terms of a Federal statute" that provided age-conditioned benefits or
established age-related criteria for participation, and for affirmative action. Id. The
exceptions extend to any "action taken to overcome the effects of conditions which
resulted in limiting participation by persons of a particular age . . ." Id. at 43. Since
numerous actions, including those condemned by the Commission, are taken to overcome
conditions which limit participation by some age group, this exception appears to be
quite broad. It is clear, however, that the Commission wished to except only a narrow
category of actions (such as outreach efforts) designed to overcome conditions that limited
an age group's participation to a level below the "fair share" for that group. Id. at 43-44.
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license; tax relief for elderly property owners or special tax exemptions
or deductions for the elderly; state juvenile justice systems; minimum
age laws for engaging in certain "adult" activities, such as consensual
sexual relations, possessing firearms, attending X-rated films, and en-
tering bars; a day-care center's policy of not admitting infants under
a certain age; the practice of maintaining separate sports leagues or
recreational facilities by age; concentrating screening for certain dis-
eases such as breast cancer on particularly susceptible age groups; and
targeting antismoking campaigns towards teenagers.
140 Moreover, the
validity of countless non-age factors would be called into serious ques-
tion by the changes.
147
Clearly, no one (and certainly not the Commission, which did not
even trouble to ask) knows exactly what laws, policies, and practices
this recommendation would invalidate or place in jeopardy. Quite
apart from uncertainties of statutory interpretation,148 considerable
difficulties would arise because no inventory of the age and age-related
distinctions or the differentiating factors other than age actually used in
federally assisted programs has ever been compiled, much less analyzed
for consistency with the ADA. 4 9 Significantly, the report shows no
evidence that the Commission ever seriously considered either the
arguments against repealing the "reasonableness" exceptions and
narrowing the "any law" exclusion, or the implications of so sweeping
an action.' 50
146. See U.S. Dep't of HEWT Fact Sheet on the House-Passed Age Discrimination
Amendments (Title IV of H.R. 12255) (1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal) [herein-
after cited as HEW Fact Sheet]. One can never be certain, of course, how a court would
construe the Commission's proposed exceptions. But a combination of factors-the legisla-
tive intent that could be inferred from Congress's deletion of the word "unreasonable"
from the ADA's statement of purpose, the breadth of the prohibition's wording, the
specificity of the remaining exceptions, and the principle that civil rights prohibitions are
remedial provisions that should be broadly construed-lend support to predictions that
such laws, policies, and practices would be in serious jeopardy unless they somehow could
be construed to qualify for the Commission's proposed affirmative action exception.
147. This is true because the Commission, in deleting the reasonableness exceptions
in the ADA, I AGE DiscRiMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 43, also would delete the
exception for any action that makes a "differentiation [that] is based upon reasonable
factors other than age." 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(B) (1976).
148. For discussion of the uncertainties of interpretation of the ADA, see Part III infra.
For discussion of some uncertainties of interpretation of the Commission's proposed
provisions, see note 145-46 supra.
149. HEW's governmentwide regulations require that such an inventory be conducted
for the first time. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,777 (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 90.32, .34. It probably
will not be completed until at least two years after the publication of final agency-specific
regulations, that is, until late 1981 at the earliest. Id. at 33,777-78.
150. Its discussion of the policy considerations that militate in favor of retaining those
exceptions, I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 39-40, is cursory, conclusory,
and simplistic. The Commission neglected entirely to discuss such considerations as the
ubiquity, reasonableness, and essentiality of the widespread use of factors other than age.
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D. The 1978 Amendments to the ADA
Despite the defects of the Commission's report and recommendations,
the House of Representatives embraced them with enthusiasm. Ten
days after the Commission released its age discrimination study, a
House subcommittee held hearings on the study in connection with
the reauthorization of the Older Americans Act.151 Shortly thereafter,
the House Education and Labor Committee unanimously reported
H.R. 1225, the Comprehensive Older Americans Act Amendments of
1978, to the floor. Contained in the bill were the major amendments
to the ADA recommended by the Commission. 52 Although the merits
of these amendments had not been analyzed in the hearings and
were not discussed either in the committee report or in floor debate,
they quickly passed the House, 361 to 6.153 The Senate, meanwhile,
had not held hearings on amendments to the ADA but had passed a
bill reauthorizing the Older Americans Act. 15 4 The House and Senate
bills were sent to a conference committee.
Swift adoption by the House of the far-reaching changes to the ADA
once again had caught the Executive Branch by surprise. Only weeks
earlier HEW had transmitted to the White House and Congress its
statutorily required response to the Commission study,155 which clearly,
151. Oversight on the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 and Extension of the Older
Americans Act of 1965: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Select Education of the House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978
Hearings]. The tone of the hearing was set by Chairman Brademas, who introduced the
first witness, Dr. Flemming, by stating that the ADA "was enacted in response to evidence
of pervasive and unconscionable age discrimination in our society." Id. at 1. In fact, the
ADA was enacted with the expectation that such evidence, if it existed, would be adduced
by the Commission in its study-an expectation the Commission failed to fulfill. Dr.
Flemming presented the Commission report and urged that Congress adopt its recom-
mendations. Additional testimony concerning the ADA came from several groups repre-
senting the elderly and from members of Congress, especially those on the Select Com-
mittee on Aging. None of the witnesses presented any additional evidence, all supported
the Commission's recommendations in general terms, and the issues raised by the recom-
mendations received no discussion. See, e.g., 1978 Hearings, supra, at 2-25, 670-86 (testimony
of Dr. Flemming), 193-225 (testimony of Jack Ossofsky, Executive Director of the National
Council on the Aging), 420-37 (testimony of Robert J. Ahrens, President of the Urban
Elderly Coalition), 556-88 (testimony of Rep. Claude Pepper).
152. See H.R. REP. No. 1150, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 122-24 (1978). The other amendments
in the bill, also recommended by the Commission, included creation of a private cause of
action to enforce the ADA, a requirement that HEW give prior approval to all regulations
issued by other departments or agencies under the ADA, creation of an alternative ad-
ministrative remedy to enforce the ADA, and a requirement that federal agencies file
annual reports on their implementation of the ADA. Id.
153. 124 CONe. REc. H3912-35 (daily ed. May 15, 1978).
154. The Senate committee did hold hearings on the Older Americans Act legislation,
but the ADA was not mentioned, the intention having been to hold separate hearings on
the Commission report. These separate hearings, however, were never held. Interview with
Steve Rowling, staff of Sen. Eagleton (Jan. 18, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
155. See Letter from Secretary Califano to Nelson Cruickshank, Counselor to the
President on Aging (April 28, 1978) (HEW response to Commission on Civil Rights' Age
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though gently, criticized the Commission's assumptions and methodol-
ogy and opposed with particular vigor any change in the existing ex-
ceptions and exclusions to the ADA.
When the full House approved sweeping amendments to the ADA,
however, HEW belatedly swung into action.156 It distributed a sum-
mary analysis of the House amendments, opposing most of them and
pointing out their potential effects on existing federal, state, local, and
private programs. 15 7 Significantly, this marked the first time since the
genesis of the ADA in 1975 that the meaning and policy consequences
of either the original statute or the proposed amendments had been
clearly addressed. HEW's resistance precipitated negotiations within
the Administration'"8 that led to a letter from Secretary Califano to
Discrimination Study) (on file with Yale Law Journal). Copies of the document also were
sent to the chairmen of the House and Senate authorizing committees. HEW did agree
that the word "unreasonable" could be deleted from the purpose clause, provided that
the reasonableness exceptions were retained, thereby continuing to allow reasonable age
distinctions in HEW-supported activities. Id. at 7-10.
156. HEW had been assured by committee staff that only procedural amendments
(such as creation of a private remedy) would be proposed, and it learned of the House
action only in late May, several weeks after passage of the House bill. Interview with
William A. Blakey, HEW Deputy Assistant Secretary for Legislation (Education) (May
1978) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
157. See HEW Fact Sheet, supra note 146. This analysis was given on a very limited
basis to certain members of Congress, committee staff, White House staff, and the Office
of Management and Budget (OMB); OMB circulated it to other Executive Branch depart-
ments and agencies, including the Civil Rights Commission.
158. The Civil Rights Commission reaffirmed its support for the House amendments,
but suggested that the bill include a provision authorizing HEW to grant temporary
waivers, pending congressional review, for state or local laws containing age distinctions.
Letter from Arthur S. Flemming to Naomi R. Sweeney, OMB (undated) (on file with Yale
Law Journal). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) also wrote in
support of the House amendments, expressing its belief that they would not preclude the
use of reasonable age distinctions by program administrators. Letter from William F.
Ware, EEOC, to Naomi R. Sweeney, OMB (June 26, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
These defenses of the House amendments were weak: the Commission's, because its new
proposal would be administratively unworkable, would authorize far broader exceptions
than the ADA permitted, and represented a tacit admission that the House amendments
would create great mischief if unchanged; the EEOC's, because it was utterly inconsistent
with the clear language and intent of the House amendments. HEW wrote to OMB to
highlight the difficulties with both the House amendments and the Commission's pro-
posal, citing letters from other departments in support of the HEW analysis. Memoran-
dum from Inez Smith Reid and Henry Aaron, HEW, to Suzanne Woolsey, OMB (Aug. 25,
1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
As the September date for convening the House-Senate conference approached, White
House staff pressed HEW and the Commission to reach an accommodation. Dr. Flemming
then proposed that the temporary waiver approach might be joined with another amend-
ment limiting the ADA's applicability to the elderly; this generated immediate opposi-
tion by children's groups. HEW began to soften its opposition to some of the House
amendments, while stiffening its resistance to what it regarded as the most pernicious
ones: the repeal of the reasonableness exceptions, and the requirements that HEW
approve the ADA regulations of other agencies and monitor a burdensome data-gathering
and reporting system. On September 8, with the conference only days away, the White
House convened a meeting of HEW, Civil Rights Commission, EEOC, OMB, and other
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the conferees opposing any change in the exceptions or exclusions. 159
When the conference committee next met, it noted Califano's letter,
expressed satisfaction that a compromise had been reached, and quickly
adopted the Administration's position. 160 The President signed the
Executive Branch officials to reach agreement upon an Administration position. That
meeting produced agreement that resulted in a September 12 letter from Secretary Califano
to the conferees.
159. Letter from Secretary Califano to conferees on Older Americans Act amendments
(Sept. 12, 1978) (on file with Yale Law Journal). This letter also addressed other sections
of the Older Americans Act amendments, and urged:
that action at this time be limited to four points: authorization of a private right of
action ... ; provision of an alternative administrative remedy in the event that any
recipient of Federal assistance is found in violation of the Act; striking of the word
"unreasonable" in Section 302 of the existing Act, only so long as the exemptions
[sic) currently in the law remain in place; and amendment to change the effective date
of Section 303 from January 1, 1979, to July 1, 1979, in order to permit the necessary
publication of proposed regulations and the receipt and evaluation of public comment.
Id. at 1-2.
160. See H.R. REP. No. 1618, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 47-48, 87 (1978). When the conference
report was issued, it was apparent that a misunderstanding had occurred. One House
amendment had required that HEW approve all regulations issued by other agencies
under the ADA, that each agency submit to HEW an annual report containing specific
age data on program participants "sufficient to permit analysis of how well the department
or agency" was implementing the ADA, and that HEW evaluate "the performance of each
department or agency" in complying with the ADA. HEW had continuously and strenuous-
ly opposed these provisions. Although the conferees had agreed to delete these provisions,
the conference report inexplicably contained both provisions unchanged.
HEW officials had several concerns. Prior approval of other agencies' regulations would
generate substantial interdepartmental friction, would create an enormous workload for
HEW staff, and could set an unfortunate precedent. The data-gathering and reporting
requirements were even more troubling. According to rough estimates compiled by HEW
staff, the potential cost of the data-collection effort could be staggering- hundreds of
millions of dollars or more, if the requirement were fully implemented-because many
of the hundreds of federal grant programs collect little or no participant data. Moreover,
the data, once compiled, would prove little about the presence or absence of age dis-
crimination in a particular program. Even if these other difficulties were surmounted,
HEW clearly would not be competent to evaluate the implementation efforts of other
agencies and would be placed in an awkward political position by such a requirement.
HEW sought to correct the apparent misunderstanding, which it acknowledged probably
resulted from a combination of ambiguity in the September 12 letter to conferees, and the
chaotic environment of an end-of-session conference on such major legislation. It raised
the matter with Representative Brademas, Senator Eagleton, and their staffs, but too late;
congressional rules preclude any nontechnical amendment to a conference report. Un-
willing to recommend a veto of the massive, delicately negotiated legislation for what
would, in the larger scheme of things, surely seem trivial, HEW requested that Brademas
and Eagleton make floor statements committing themselves to seek repeal of these pro-
visions prior to the new July 1, 1979 effective date of the ADA regulations. While each
made a floor statement setting forth the Administration's objections to the provisions,
neither made any commitment to seek legislative change. 124 CONG. REc. Hi,446 (daily
ed. Oct. 4, 1978) (remarks of Rep. Brademas), id. at S17,679 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1978)
(remarks of Sen. Eagleton). To make matters worse, Congress adopted a concurrent
resolution adding to the 1978 ADA amendments a provision creating a new administrative
remedy; the provision had been agreed to in conference, see id. at Hli,446 (daily ed. Oct.
4, 1978), but was inadvertently omitted from the conference report. That resolution failed
to address, however, the provisions to which HEW objected so strenuously, probably
because any such amendment would not have been merely technical. HEW's effort to
devise relatively inexpensive data requirements appears at 44 Fed. Reg. 33,784 (1979).
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Older Americans Act legislation, including the 1978 amendments to
the ADA, on October 18.161 The exceptions and exclusions remained
unchanged. In June 1979, after holding public hearings and receiving
written public comments, HEW issued the general, governmentwide
regulations under the ADA to which each federal department and
agency must conform its own additional regulations. 10 2
III. Interpreting the ADA: Reading Shadows on Walls
While little else may be certain about the ADA, it is clear that it
will spawn a great deal of litigation. Several aspects of the ADA invite
efforts to test its limits and meaning: the programmatic breadth of
its coverage, which includes virtually all federally assisted activities;
the sweeping nature of its prohibitory language; its ambiguous excep-
tions and exclusions; its unusually sparse legislative history; the man-
ner in which HEW interpreted the reasonableness exceptions in its
governmentwide regulations; 16 3 and the continuing (indeed, after the
Commission's report, growing) uncertainty concerning the nature,
meaning, and extent of age discrimination. The creation in the 1978
amendments of a statutory scheme for private enforcement, together
with provision for award of reasonable attorneys' fees to prevailing
plaintiffs, will surely spur court challenges.
1 1
4
The ADA regulations issued by HEW leave open most of the dif-
ficult legal and policy choices under the statute. In attempting to
determine the meaning of the ADA's ambiguous provisions, the
agencies and courts will confront two major sets of issues: the scope
161. 14 WEEKLY CosiP. oF PEsu. Doc. 1792-94 (Oct. 18, 1978). In addition to the
amendments that the Administration had agreed to in the September 12 letter, the law
included a requirement of prior approval of regulations by HEW and imposed data-
gathering and reporting requirements. Amendments to the Older Americans Act of 1965,
Pub. L. No. 95-478, § 401, 92 Stat. 1555 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6104 (West 1979)).
162. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90). Each agency must
publish its proposed regulations no later than 90 days after the publication date of the
final HEW regulations, and must submit its final regulations for HEW approval no later
than 120 days after publication of the proposed agency regulations. Thus, the ADA will
not be fully implemented until some time in 1980, at the earliest.
163. See pp. 71-72 infra.
164. Numerous organizations advocate and litigate the rights and interests of the
elderly, including the National Council of Senior Citizens, the National Council on Aging,
and the American Association of Retired Persons. See R. BUTLER, supra note 58, at 334-43;
H. PRATr, supra note 63, at 86-103. These organizations, as well as the child-advocate
organizations, will doubtless find this remedy to be an effective advocacy tool. A parallel
private remedy against entities receiving revenue-sharing funds also exists. See note 166
infra. The governmentwide regulations under the ADA establish a system to mediate
complaints. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, 33,775 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90). The
brief time periods provided, however, may prevent mediation from diverting a large
number of complaints away from the courts.
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of the activities to which the ADA applies, and the scope of the
reasonableness exceptions from its prohibition. Consistent with the
conceptualization of age as a classificatory criterion developed in Part I,
I shall argue that in the absence of clear congressional guidance,
agencies and courts should approach these interpretive questions in a
permissive spirit, rejecting only those uses of age for which the con-
sequences on the whole appear to be manifestly undesirable, and
rejecting only those non-age factors that are clearly arbitrary or are
used with an intent to discriminate invidiously.
A. The Coverage of the ADA
The ADA applies to all "programs or activities receiving Federal
financial assistance,"oa including programs or activities receiving funds
under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972."16 Two
165. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1976). The phrase "program or activities receiving federal
financial assistance," which defines the scope of coverage of the ADA at the broadest level,
derives from similar language in Title VI and § 504. It also appears in Title IX, but there
is limited to "education program or activity." 20 U.S.C. § 1684 (1976). Section 504, unlike
Titles VI and IX, contains no exclusion for contracts of insurance or guaranty. Compare
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (codifying § 504) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4 (1976) (Title VI) and
20 U.S.C. § 1685 (1976) (Title IX).
Although its precise limits have not been established, the phrase is clearly quite broad.
See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 597, 604 (D.S.C. 1974), aff'd per curiam,
529 F.2d 514 (4th Cir. 1975) (review of Title VI history warrants expansive reading of
provisions). But see Board of Pub. Instruction of Taylor County, Fla. v. Finch, 414 F.2d
1068, 1078 (5th Cir. 1969) (adopting limited reading of authority to terminate certain
funds under Title VI). Federal agencies have construed the phrase broadly in their regula-
tions. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.13(f), (g) (1978) (HEW Title VI regulation); id. § 84.3(h)
(HEW § 504 regulation).
Because of the high utilization of health care services by the elderly, an important
coverage issue under the ADA is its applicability to the hundreds of thousands of
providers under the Medicare and Medicaid programs. By analogy to Title VI and § 504,
the ADA appears to be applicable to providers under Medicaid and under the basic
Medicare program ("Part A"); the situation with respect to Part B of the Medicare
program is less clear. See 45 C.F.R. § 84, app. A, subpt. A (construing applicability of
HEW regulations to Medicare providers). In the past, Part B of Medicare, which provides
for supplementary medical insurance at the option of the beneficiary, generally has not
been construed to constitute federal financial assistance under either Title VI or § 504.
Id. Though there is no reason to regard Part B differently under the ADA, the issue
has been under active reconsideration by HEW. Interview with Office of General Counsel,
HEW (January 25, 1979) (notes on file with Yale Law Journal).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 6101 (1976). The phrase "including programs or activities receiving
funds under the State and Local Fiscal Assistance Act of 1972" refers to programs or
activities funded under general revenue sharing. 31 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976). The general
revenue sharing legislation was itself amended in 1976 to provide that the prohibitions of
the ADA and § 504 also would apply to "any program or activity of a State government
or unit of local government, which government or unit receives funds made available
under" the general revenue sharing law. State and Local Fiscal Assistance Amendments
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-488, § 8, 90 Stat. 2341 (1976) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1242(a)(1)
(1976)). Because of the difficulty of tracing the disposition of revenue-sharing funds after
they are received by a locality, however, the 1976 amendment provided an exemption
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exclusions from this comprehensive coverage exist, however; one is
for certain employment-related practices, 0 7 and the other for programs
"established under authority of" certain types of laws. The latter
exception has particularly significant legal and policy implications.
Section 304(b)(2) of the ADA provides:
The provisions of this title shall not apply to any program or
activity established under authority of any law which (A) provides
any benefits or assistance to persons based upon the age of such
persons; or (B) establishes criteria for participation in age-related
terms or describes intended beneficiaries or target groups in such
terms.1
68
The scope of this exclusion is important in determining the impact
of the ADA because numerous federal, state, and local laws and regula-
tions contain age distinctions,'0 9 and because programs or activities
qualifying under section 304(b)(2) need not qualify under the reason-
ableness exceptions. One question of statutory interpretation is par-
ticularly crucial: beyond federal statutes, which are clearly included,
what categories does the phrase "established under authority of any
law" embrace?"' 0 Depending upon how this issue is resolved, the ADA's
coverage could range from extremely narrow to quite broad.
from the prohibition only where the state or local government demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that the allegedly discriminatory program or activity was not in fact
funded with general revenue-sharing funds. 31 U.S.C. § 1242(a)(2)(A) (1976). This shift
in the burden of proof as to use of federal assistance may effectively expand the scope of
the ADA's coverage to situations in which a program is not designated as receiving revenue
sharing funds, but revenue sharing funds free up nonfederal funds that are then used by
the program in a discriminatory manner. See S. REP. No. 1207, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27,
(1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5151, 5177 (1976). This prohibition,
like that in the ADA itself, was fortified by provision of a private remedy buttressed by
awards of reasonable attorneys' fees, 31 U.S.C. § 1244 (1976), thereby providing an ad-
ditional remedy for many plaintiffs in age discrimination cases, albeit one subject to
somewhat different procedures. Indeed, the congressional debate concerning the ADA
emphasized the existence of other potential remedies for age discrimination under federal
law and the intention to retain them unchanged. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REc. 37,735 (1975)
(remarks of Sen. Eagleton); id. at 37,748 (remarks of Sen. Cranston).
167. See 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c) (1976). The legislative history of this provision suggests
a gradual narrowing of the exclusion. See H.R. Res. 3922, § 308, 94th Cong., Ist Sess.,
121 CONG. REc. 9203, 9209 (1975); 121 CONG. REc. 9212 (1975); Conference Report, supra
note 9, at 58; 44 Fed. Reg. 33,776 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90); Pub. L. No.
95-256, § 3, 92 Stat. 189 (1978).
168. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) (1976).
169. See pp. 53-54 supra; HEW Fact Sheet, supra note 146 (citing examples).
170. Another question-whether the two "which" clauses in 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)
(1976) modify the phrase "program or activity" or the phrase "any law"-is one of the
few questions to which the meager legislative history provides a fairly clear answer: the
clauses modify "any law." See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 58; 121 CONG. R C.
9209 (1975); Memorandum, supra note 98, at 3.
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The legislative history reveals only one direct reference to section
304(b)(2) that even arguably sheds any light on this question, and that
reference cannot be regarded as very helpful. 171 Several other passages,
not explicitly directed at section 304(b)(2), could support an argument
that "program or activity established under authority of any law" in
this context does not include programs or activities established
pursuant to regulations, but embraces only those established pursuant
to statute. Such support, however, is at best indirect. 7 2 The contrary
argument-that the phrase extends to programs authorized by regula-
tion validly promulgated pursuant to statute-finds no explicit sup-
port in the legislative history, and must instead rest upon one or both
of two notions: (1) that "any law" includes any official issuance (such
as regulations) having the force of law;' 73 and (2) that "established
under authority" has a more expansive reach than "established in" or
"established by" any law would have, and would include any action
that is ultimately legitimized by statute.
Whether regulations fall within the exclusion or not, a most far-
reaching question remains: does the phrase "any law" refer only to
federal law? The legislative history, while bearing only indirectly on
171. In explaining the addition of clause (B), the Conference Report noted that the
House bill limited the exclusion to "programs for which the law provides benefits to
persons based on such person's age, such as with Social Security." CONFERENCE REPORT,
sul~ra note 9, at 58. Social Security is clearly cited, however, merely as one example of
such a law; there is no implication that, because the age-based Social Security program
is established by statute, "law" is tantamount to "statute."
172. The most persuasive support for this proposition appears in the Conference Re-
port's discussion of the conferees' lack of consensus as to which age-related distinctions
are "reasonable." Id. at 56. The report notes "basic differences on the extent to which
age may validly be taken into account by program administrators in determining who is
eligible to participate in programs, in the absence of statutorily-established criteria re-
garding age." Id. The last clause could be a reference to § 304(b)(2); see 121 CONG.
REC. 37,299 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Quie) (ADA "does not apply to reasonable and
necessary distinctions based upon age, or to distinctions which are made pursuant to a
statute or necessary to the achievement of a statutory objective"); id. at 37,735 (1975)
(remarks of Sen. Eagleton) (referring to Social Security and to "legislation," but in con-
text of discussing reasonableness exceptions rather than § 304(b)(2)). The HEW
memorandum distributed earlier to the conference committee staff appeared to have
assumed that the § 304(b)(2) exclusion might not embrace regulations but would embrace
certain state plans. Memorandum, supra note 98, at 4.
173. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (establishing federal right of action for deprivation
of rights "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage"). The
phrase "under the authority of any law" was recently used elsewhere by Congress in the
Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2013(b) (West 1979), but no reported case has yet construed
this clause of the provision. The Department of Agriculture's General Counsel, if con-
fronted with a regulation arguably relevant to this provision, would construe the provision
to include such a regulation on the basis of the presumed congressional intent underlying
the provision. See Memorandum from Margaret Porter, Office of General Counsel, HEW,
to Inez Smith Reid, Deputy General Counsel, HEW (May 16, 1978) (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
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this question, suggests that the exclusion extends beyond federal law. 174
To the extent that state law is embraced within section 304(b)(2), local
law should be embraced as well, for the latter is an extension of the
former. Because the precise division of legislative powers between state
and local jurisdictions varies from state to state,170 the contrary view-
that state law is exempted but local law is not-would mean that the
same rule might well be exempted in one state and covered in another.
So long as a local ordinance possesses the requisite degree of formality
to qualify as a "law," it should qualify for the exclusion.
Although these conclusions with respect to state and local law are
based upon the most meager intimations in the legislative history, they
are nevertheless fortified by certain practical considerations. Regula-
tion of public health, morals, and safety-the exercise of the police
power-has traditionally been a state and local function and has
employed numerous age distinctions that are seldom controversial. 17
It is most unlikely-and certainly the legislative history does not sug-
gest-that Congress, in enacting the ADA, intended to disturb these
and many other such provisions of state and local law. Indeed, it is
doubtful that Congress intended even to raise any question as to their
continuing validity.' 77 Only by excluding state and local law from
coverage by the ADA could such immunity be assured.' 78 The govern-
174. Three pieces of evidence support this conclusion. First, when the conference was
deliberating over the ADA in October 1975, HEW officials were told by the conference
committee staff that the phrase "any law" was meant not to be limited to federal law, but
should include state and local laws as well. See Memorandum, supra note 98, at 4. Second,
the House adopted an amendment to the ADA in 1978 that would have transformed
§ 304(b)(2) into an exception limited to actions "specifically directed or provided by the
terms of a Federal statute" that provides age-conditioned benefits or establishes age-
related criteria for participation. 124 CONG. REC. H3924, 3934 (daily ed. May 15, 1978).
This amendment was deleted in conference, H.R. REP. No. 1618, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87
(1978), reprinted in Part in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3429, 3463, which suggests
that, by retaining the more general "under authority of any law" foundation, Congress
preferred to exclude from coverage more than simply federal statutes. Third, Congress's
reference to "the goals of the Federal statute" in the 1978 amendment to § 8305(b) of
the ADA could be taken to suggest that the broader phrase "any law" was not intended
to be limited to federal statutes. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6104 (West 1979).
175. D. LOcKARD, THE POLITICS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 5-6 (1969 ed.) (noting
vast differences in ways states divide political power).
176. Disagreements, when they exist, tend to concern the particular age cut-offs that
should be employed, not the legitimacy of some age distinction. See HEW Fact Sheet,
supra note 146, at 2.
177. The HEW Fact Sheet, circulated in 1978 to head off a House amendment that
greatly narrowed § 304(b)(2) and eliminated the reasonableness exceptions, noted that the
amendment would call these state and local law provisions into question. Id. The
amendment was subsequently deleted in conference. See pp. 57-58 supra.
178. It is not obvious that all state law provisions would qualify for one of the reason-
ableness exceptions, although many surely would. Nevertheless, the Department of Justice
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mentwide regulations under the ADA have adopted this position70
The practical consequences of a narrower interpretation of section
304(b)(2) would be far-reaching; if adopted, thousands of well-estab-
lished and noncontroversial state and local laws could possibly be
brought within the reach of the ADA's prohibition.
B. The Reasonableness Exceptions
The ADA contains three exceptions to the prohibition against age
discriminationS built, both textually and conceptually, upon a funda-
mental principle: certain uses of age criteria to distinguish between
groups of people, and certain uses of non-age criteria that produce
different results for different age groups, are reasonable allocative de-
vices and ought to be sustained. It is important to contrast this principle
with that underlying Title VI. Racial distinctions would not be ac-
cepted under Title VI even if they were deemed "reasonable"; 18 1 they
must be "necessary" to vindicate a "substantial" governmental in-
terest.'8 2 No classification on the basis of race or ethnicity has met this
test in thirty-five years except when it has been favorable to certain
minorities.
8 3
has taken the rather surprising position that the "authority of any law" provision should
embrace no state statutes. Memorandum from John M. Harmon, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, Dep't of Justice, to HEW Secretary Joseph Califano at
6 (Feb. 8, 1979) (on file with Yale Law Journal). The Department favored permitting
federal statutes and regulations to be excluded from the scope of the ADA, but could see
no basis for such treatment of state statutes and local ordinances. Id. at 6-7.
179. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,776 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90.3(b)(1)).
180. H.R.1255, reprinted in 124 CONG. URc. 3912-35 (daily ed. May 15, 1978). Each
exception was repealed in the House amendments of 1978, only to be restored in con-
ference; thus, they remain as originally enacted.
181. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (Powell, J.,
announcing judgment of the Court) ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are in-
herently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.")
182. Id. at 305.
183. The last cases to meet this test were the World War II Japanese internment
cases, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (adoption of wartime measure to
uphold public safety not unconstitutional even though based on racial distinctions ir-
relevant in most circumstances), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)
(upholding order excluding civilians of Japanese descent from certain West Coast areas).
Some cases, however, appear to countenance nonpreferential uses of race under very
limited circumstances not involving differential benefits. See, e.g., Lee v. Washington, 390
U.S. 333 (1968) (authorizing racial segregation of prisons under limited circumstances,
such as racial tension, when required for prison security and discipline); Hamm v.
Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156, 158 (E.D. Va.), aff'd Per curiam sub
non. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (upholding statute requiring divorce decrees
to denote race of parties). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1976), which contains a reasonableness exception similar to one of those in the ADA,
makes that exception inapplicable to discrimination on the basis of race. See id. § 2000e-
2(e) (exempting only distinctions based on religion, sex, or national origin). Sex has not
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Courts have recognized that the use of age to differentiate between
groups of people often will be "reasonable" and that the "reasonable-
ness" of such classifications ordinarily will suffice to sustain them
against legal challenge under the equal protection clause.'
84 In the
leading case of Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,
1s5 the
Supreme Court upheld under the relaxed, rational-basis standard a
statute mandating that uniformed state police retire at age fifty.'
86 The
Court distinguished age classifications from other classifications that
are deemed "suspect" and therefore require strict judicial scrutiny.1
8 7
The aged, the Court stated, "unlike, say, those who have been dis-
criminated against on the basis of race or national origin, have not
experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been sub-
jected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics
not truly indicative of their abilities."' Furthermore, "even old age
does not define a 'discrete and insular' group . . . in need of 'extra-
ordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' Instead,
it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out our normal
span."18 9
While the Court's cursory analysis of these matters was not wholly
satisfactory, 19 0 its conclusion-that age discrimination involves different
considerations than other prohibited forms of discrimination-seems
amply justified.' 91 Many of these considerations already have been
yet been characterized by a majority of the Court as a "suspect" classification. See
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 303 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing
judgment of the Court) ("the Court has never viewed such [sex-based] classification as
inherently suspect or as comparable to racial or ethnic classifications for the purpose of
equal protection analysis"); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (only four of
nine Justices finding sex-based classification "suspect"). Nevertheless, Title IX does not
generally permit federally assisted education programs to justify differential treatment of
the sexes as reasonable. See note 18 supra.
184. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. If the right in question is "fundamental", however,
the age classification will be subjected to strict scrutiny. See Massachusetts Bd. of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n.3 (1976) (listing such fundamental rights).
185. 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). The case was brought under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment; no claim was made under the ADEA.
186. Id. at 310 n.2.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 313-14 (citation omitted).
190. The Court cited no authority to support either of these propositions or to rebut
the contrary point of view; neither did it advert to the fact that Congress had enacted
the ADEA, at least, on the basis of opposite premises.
191. See Vance v. Bradley, 99 S. Ct. 939 (1979) (upholding under rational basis test
mandatory retirement age under Foreign Service retirement system). But compare Mastie
v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424,F. Supp. 1299, 1306 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (age discrimination
"unique from race, sex or national origin discrimination") with Marshall v. Arlene Knit-
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discussed: the advantages of age as a classificatory criterion;192 the
demonstrated ability of the elderly to protect their interests in the
political process; 19 3 the reality of a high correlation between people's
ages and certain of their needs and abilities;' 94 the widespread pro-
grammatic use of age as a proxy for other characteristics that should not
or could not be measured directly; 95 the ubiquitous and inescapable
use of non-age factors having differential age-specific impacts; 96 and
the relatively secure political safeguards against arbitrary uses of age
and factors other than age.' 97 It is all the more striking, then, that
neither the legislative history of the ADA nor the Civil Rights Com-
mission report reflects recognition, much less discussion, of these con-
siderations. 98
wear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (age discrimination "equally pernicious"
as race and sex discrimination).
192. See pp. 33-35 suPra.
193. See pp. 41-42 supra; cf. Vance v. Bradley, 90 S. Ct. 939, 943 n.12 (1979) (describ-
ing Congress's 1978 amendments to ADEA restricting mandatory retirement as evidence
"that the political system is working"). For an advocate's less optimistic view of the
political influence of the elderly, see R. BUTLER, supra note 58, at 321-50.
Children present a special case; they have received much protection and attention in
the political process, but only at the instance of their parents and other adults. This
dependence of children and youths upon others to protect their interests complicates the
questions of whether, and to what extent, discrimination on the basis of age can be
reasonable. As the law increasingly recognizes conflicts of interest between parents and
other supervisory adults on the one hand, and children on the other, notions of reason-
able age-based distinctions in the treatment of children increasingly will be called into
question. See Burt, The Constitution and the Family, 1979 Sup. CT. Rlv. (forthcoming);
Goldstein, Medical Care for the Child at Risk: On State Supervention of Parental
Autonomy, 86 YALE L.J. 645 (1977).
194. See p. 36 supra.
195. See pp. 34-35 supra. Such uses of age also are found in numerous voluntary
social arrangements, reflecting the belief that separation by age is often appropriate: e.g.,
age-based sports leagues, YMCA's, scouting organizations, residential communities for the
elderly, and parent-teacher associations. Indeed, such separation will often be a pre-
requisite for equal treatment of different age groups. See note 217 infra. In contrast,
differences between racial or ethnic groups with respect to needs or capabilities are not
thought to exist as a function of race or ethnicity; differential or separate treatment on
the basis of race, especially treatment that is not preferential to a minority, has long
been socially and constitutionally stigmatized. See notes 14 & 43 supra.
196. See pp. 35-37 supra.
197. See pp. 41-42 supra; O'Donnell, Lasser, & Bailor, The Federal Age Discrimina-
tion Statute: Basic Law, Areas of Controversy, and Suggestions for Compliance, 15 WAKE
FoaRr L. Rxv. 1 (1979) (examining protections afforded workers by age discrimination
legislation).
198. Acknowledgment that such differences even might exist rarely surfaced. See CoN-
FERENcE REPoRT, supra note 9, at 56; 121 CONG. REc. 37,735 (1975) (remarks of Sen.
Eagleton); Memorandum, suPra note 98, at 1-2; Fact Sheet, supra note 146, at 1-5; and
Letter from Weinberger, supra note 91, at 1-2. Of these, only the HEW memorandum and
Fact Sheet (neither of which was an official document) and Senator Eagleton actually
discussed these differences.
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1. The "Normal Operation" Exception
Section 304(b)(1)(A) of the ADA provides in part:
It shall not be a violation of any provision of this chapter, or of any
regulation issued under this chapter, for any person to take any
action otherwise prohibited by [this Act] if, in the program or
activity involved-(A) such action reasonably takes into account
age as a factor necessary to the normal operation.., of such pro-
gram or activity. 199
Despite the breadth, ambiguity, and importance of this exception,
there is virtually no legislative history bearing upon either its source
or its meaning.2 00 We need not guess at its genesis, however, for it
closely parallels the language of the "bona fide occupational qualifica-
tion" (BFOQ) exceptions in the ADEA201 and Title VII °202
The BFOQ exception under the ADEA provides the best analogy-
199. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (1976).
200. The original bills contained this exception in the form ultimately adopted. See
CONFERENcE REPORT, supra note 9, at 52-55. The only mention of the exception in the
legislative history came in the conference report, which simply quoted the exceptions,
noting that they modify the prohibition of discrimination "by considerations of reason-
ableness." Id. at 56.
201. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(t)(1) (1976).
202. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). The BFOQ exception is not available under
Title VII, however, in cases in which the defendant acted on the basis of the employee's
race. Id. § 2000e-2(a). The Supreme Court recently noted that the BFOQ exception in
Title VII was intended as "an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition
of" sex discrimination. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977). The ADA excep-
tion is textually different from the BFOQ exception. The BFOQ exception provides that
such a qualification must be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation" of a
particular business. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976) (ADEA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976)
(Title VII). The ADA provision, however, excepts an action that "reasonably takes into
account age as a factor necessary to the normal operation" of a program or activity. ADA
§ 304(b)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (1976). There is an additional difference: the
ADEA and Title VII refer to "the normal operation of a particular business," whereas
the ADA refers to "the normal operation ... of such program or activity." Presumably,
however, this discrepancy merely reflects the different contexts in which the two laws
were to operate: the ADEA and Title VII in employment, the ADA in federally assisted
programs and activities.
The legislative history does not mention, much less elucidate, this transposition of
"reasonably" and "necessary." Although the displacement may appear to be technical
and inconsequential, the two formulations do appear to possess somewhat different
meanings, implying a narrower ambit for the ADA exception than for the BIFOQ
exceptions of Title VII and the ADEA. A requirement that a reasonable use of the age
factor be necessary to the normal operation of a program arguably entails a more
rigorous showing than a requirement that use of a BFOQ of age merely be reasonably
necessary to normal operations. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 576 F.2d 983,
994 n.14 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 99 S. Ct. 1854 (1979) ("reasonably necessary" as framed by
courts means not entirely necessary but somewhat necessary); cf. McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819) (word "necessary" "frequently imports no more than
that one thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another").
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although, for reasons discussed later, an imperfect one-for use in
deriving the meaning of the parallel exception in the ADA.203 Only
a handful of cases, however, have construed the BFOQ exception in
the ADEA and none has reached the Supreme Court.2 0 4 The Fifth
Circuit decision in Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.20 5 elaborated
a two-pronged test based upon principles developed in sex discrimina-
tion cases to determine whether the BFOQ exception applies. 200 Under
this test, the employer bears the burden of proving that the age require-
ment is "reasonably necessary to the essence of his business," 20 7 and
that the employer has "reasonable cause, that is, a factual basis, for
believing that all or substantially all persons [within the plaintiff's
class] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of
the job involved, or [that] it is impossible or impractical to deal with
persons [within the plaintiff's class] on an individualized basis." 20 8
This test highlights the heavy burdens that the employer must sus-
tain in order to qualify for a BFOQ exception.20 9 The employer must
demonstrate business necessity, not business convenience; "the essence
of the business operation" must be at stake.210 The employer also must
demonstrate either that the generalization upon which the BFOQ
rests is true or that its validity as applied to specific individuals would
be "impossible or impractical" to test.21 1 Nevertheless, most cases in
which age has been advanced as a BFOQ have involved allegations of
203. It bears emphasis here, as well as with respect to the other exceptions, that
nowhere does the legislative history of the ADA indicate that the ADEA either served as
the model for the ADA or is to provide an analogy for interpreting the exceptions. The
sole reference to the ADEA was in connection with the coverage provisions of § 504(c) of
the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(c)(2) (1976).
204. See, e.g., Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 591 (5th Cir. 1978);
Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123, 1124 (5th Cir. 1977).
205. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
206. Id. at 234-36 (test based on holdings in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969), and Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971)).
207. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976) (emphasis
in original).
208. Id. at 236 (emphasis in original).
209. See Note, The Age Discrimination in EmPloyment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REv.
380, 388-99 (1976) (discussing burdens involved in Title VII and ADEA cases).
210. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 234 n.24 (5th Cir. 1976)
(emphasis in original); see Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413, 432
(N.D. Cal. 1977) ("the asserted business interests . . . must be related to the primary
purpose or essence of the business operation" and "the policy must be reasonably cal-
culated to further" those interests).
211. This second prong of the test will be difficult to apply. Though determining
suitability on in individual basis will rarely be impossible, it will often be expensive.
The trade-off between the desirability of individualized employment decisions and the
costs to the employer has not been treated as a serious problem by the courts, perhaps be-
cause they have been dealing with relatively clear-cut cases.
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safety risks allegedly brought about by employing older workers, 212
and courts in such cases have been receptive to this defense, stressing
the importance of affording the employer "substantial discretion in
selecting specific standards which, if they err at all, should err on the
side of preservation of life and limb."213 Where safety considerations
have been less compelling, however, courts have been less deferential
to employers.214
Some important differences in context, however, argue against courts
and agencies casually adopting BFOQ principles developed under
Title VII and the ADEA when construing the ADA. First, textual
disparities between the BFOQ provisions and the normal operation
exception may justify different interpretations.2 15
Second, the phrase "normal operation" often will be more difficult
to define in the context of federally assisted programs than in the con-
text of businesses covered by the ADEA. Federal programs often have
purposes that are vague, ambiguous, conflicting, and changing over
time; they also are operated in a political environment in which their
"normal operation" is relatively ill-defined. The criteria of safety and
efficiency of a business, so conspicuous in the cases interpreting BFOQ
under Title VII and ADEA, require different meanings when applied
to complex public programs such as public service employment under
CETA.216 Moreover, the kinds of evidentiary showings needed to
212. E.g., Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976) (upholding
as BFOQ rule prohibiting initial employment of individuals over 40 years old as intercity
bus drivers); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1122 (1975) (upholding as BFOQ rule requiring intercity bus drivers be under 35).
But see Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 966 (1977) (employer transfer of 53-year-old test pilot to nonflying position on
basis of age not upheld as BFOQ because evidence did not support generalization and
accurate individual testing was possible).
213. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 238 (5th Cir. 1976).
214. See, e.g., Rodriquez v. Taylor, 428 F. Supp. 1118 (E.D. Pa. 1976), vacated on other
grounds, 569 F.2d 1231 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (city's maximum age
requirement of 41 for initial employment of security officer not BFOQ where safety factor
not important, and inexpensive and accurate tests can be devised to test suitability); Aaron
v. Davis, 414 F. Supp. 453, 462 (E.D. Ark. 1976) (mandatory retirement age of 62 for
fireman not BFOQ where safety factors less important than in Hodgson v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), and no showing
that periodic physical examination could not test suitability).
215. See note 202 supra.
216. Because most cases applying the BFOQ exceptions have involved safety considera-
tions that both parties agree are at the heart of the normal operation of the business in
question, the courts have not spoken clearly on the meaning of that phrase, focusing
instead on the question of whether the age or sex requirement is reasonably necessary to
the vindication of those safety objectives. Nevertheless, "normal operation" seems to be
interpreted as "essence" in Title VII cases. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333
(1976) (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971))
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qualify for the normal operation exception often will be more diffi-
cult to make than the showing needed for a BFOQ exception. It is one
thing to require employers to adduce data justifying age limitations
for bus drivers or aircraft pilots; it is quite another to require data
showing, for example, that targeting scarce social services funds on
day care for preschoolers (rather than infants, toddlers, or school-age
children) or on adoption agencies that place only infants (rather than
say, teenagers), is "necessary to the normal operation" of the program
in question. The former can be done through conventional testing of
physical capabilities for performing a well-defined job; the latter de-
pends not so much upon empirical relationships as upon normative and
highly debatable hypotheses concerning the nature of the program,
who is responsible for defining the program, the relationship between
program operations and complex social phenomena such as child
development or family stability, and the share of program benefits that
should be regarded as fair and responsive to need with respect to
different age groups.
Third, public programs, because they are financed with tax dollars,
are and ought to be more concerned than private employers with the
equal treatment of large groups of people. This assumption suggests
that it often will be necessary to treat different age groups differently
or even separately in order to treat them equally.217 Moreover, "bright
line" rules, such as age requirements, often will be necessary in order
to minimize the exercise of official discretion in allocating public
benefits or enforcing public prohibitions on the basis of criteria that
are difficult to measure or to apply objectively and that are therefore
("discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business would be
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively") (emphasis in original).
Similarly, cases under the ADEA seem to adopt the "essence" construction. See Usery v.
Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976) (safe transportation "essence"
of bus service).
The definition of "normal operation" in the governmentwide regulations under the
ADA-"the operation of a program or activity without significant changes that would
impair its ability to meet its objectives"-seems somewhat broader than "essence." See
44 Fed. Reg. 33,777 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90.13). The Department of Justice
favors a far broader construction of the exception, one that would permit age-limited
medical school admissions policies on the basis of cost-benefit considerations. Memorandum
from John M. Harmon, sutra note 178, at 10-11.
217. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1974) (Title VI regulations require
differential treatment of protected group). Like the handicapped, the elderly often require
special housing because of their medical, homemaking, transportation, and other needs.
Cf. 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(iv) (1978) (prohibiting different or separate aids, benefits, or
services to handicapped "unless such action is necessary to provide [them] with aid,
benefits, or services that are as effective as those provided to others"); id. § 80.3(b) (pro-
hibiting different treatment for recipients under any program receiving federal assistance,
with lone exception for affirmative action to overcome effects of prior discrimination).
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subject to the risk of abuse, manipulation, and unjust application. 21
It would be intolerable, for example, for public officials to determine
on an individualized basis which young people were mature enough
to vote, view "adult" movies, leave school, consent to sexual inter-
course, be subjected to the adult criminal justice system, or operate
a motor vehicle; to determine which elderly people should be subjected
to the "retirement test" or receive Social Security benefits; or to de-
termine which middle-aged persons should remain eligible for a
military draft. In contrast, employers usually are concerned with rel-
atively few characteristics, such as physical strength or possession of
certain skills, and these usually can be measured rather easily on an
individualized basis without much risk of unfairness. 21 9
Finally, the economic incentives confronting employers and those
confronting operators of federally assisted programs are very different.
Quite apart from whether an invidiously discriminatory purpose exists,
an employer often will have a strong economic incentive to terminate
older workers first-or refrain from hiring them at all-because the
employer believes that they occasion both higher direct costs, arising
from higher salaries, fringe benefits, and pension rights, and higher
indirect costs, arising from the possibility that older workers will be
less productive or adaptable. 220 In contrast, most programs covered by
the ADA have no obvious economic incentives to adopt policies that
disadvantage particular age groups, and may have some political in-
centives not to do so.
221
Overall, these considerations militate in favor of a broader con-
struction of the normal operation exception to the ADA than of the
comparable BFOQ provision of the ADEA. Nevertheless, such a rule
218. See Goldstein, On Being Adult in Secular Law, 105 DAEDALUS 69, 72 (1976) (ex-
plaining "bright-line" phenomenon for age).
219. Cf. Note, supra note 209, at 410 ("availability of alternative, affordable tests to
determine exactly the point at which degenerative processes do begin may be extremely
limited").
220. See Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 572-87 (1979). The extent to which an employer
may respond to those incentives without violating the ADEA is not altogether clear. Id.
at 574-87; cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (Title VII does
not require employer to incur more than de minimus cost to accommodate religious
needs of employee).
221. See pp. 41-42 supra (noting political influence of elderly). There are doubtless
some programs in which serving certain age groups is more costly. Nutrition services, for
example, may be more costly to provide to the homebound elderly, who find it difficult
to congregate at meal sites, than to younger, more mobile beneficiaries. Similarly,
adolescents tend to require more costly family planning services than adults. Other pro-
grams are likely to benefit some age groups less than others. For example, school-age
children will tend not to benefit as much from Head Start as preschoolers, and people
over 65 will tend not to benefit as much from job training as workers in their twenties.
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of construction will still call into question the validity of many com-
mon uses of age, for the reasonableness of an age-based classification is
likely to be determined more upon the basis of subjective choices
among conflicting goals than upon objective or conclusive evidence.
Consider, for example, the policy of many medical schools of not
accepting applicants over a certain age.22 2 This policy apparently re-
flects a good-faith effort to allocate a very scarce and publicly sub-
sidized resource-medical school education-to those likely to remain
in practice longest, thus maximizing the social benefits from the use
of that resource. On the other hand, the age of particular medical
students has no apparent bearing on the program of medical educa-
tion, and certainly is not "necessary to [its] normal operation." At
bottom, this issue is one of conflicting values: that society should
ensure that its scarce resources are allocated efficiently, 223 and that age
should be irrelevant to an individual's professional opportunities. As
such, it is not an issue that can be resolved or even significantly nar-
rowed by resorting to statistical correlations between, for example, age
and intellectual ability, or to evidence concerning projected duration
of medical practice.2
24
In the end, the availability of the exception in such cases will turn
upon value choices by bureaucrats and judges. Those choices should
be informed, and in some cases concluded, by the resolution of a
number of factual questions: What is the nature of the particular pro-
gram or activity and of its "normal operation"? What are the ethical,
cost, administrative, and behavioral considerations that might justify
age classifications? Does the program have a procedure for dealing with
the unusual case in which applying the age rule would work a sub-
stantial injustice?22 5 Is there any reason to doubt the good faith of
those who devise or apply the rule?
In addition to these factual questions, a crucial issue of law will
222. See I AGE DISCRIMINATION STUDY, suPra note 112, at 38 (28 of 114 medical schools
specify such restrictions).
223. See 121 CONG. REc. 37,735 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Eagleton).
224. For a decision demonstrating the difficulty of drawing legal conclusions from
generalized correlations between age and behavioral characteristics, see Marina Point, Ltd.
v. Wolfson, No. A15829 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 1978), rev'd, 48 U.S.L.W. 2263
(Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1979). In this case, the trial court held that an apartment complex
could not exclude adults with children on the grounds that children in general tend to
be noisy and cause damage, because it was not possible to correlate age with degree of
disruptiveness. The appellate court reversed, holding that no precise correlation was
required. 48 U.S.L.W. 2263, 2264 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 1979).
225. The preamble to the governmentwide regulations under the ADA notes that
"Other things being equal, an age distinction is more likely to qualify under one of the
statutory exceptions if it does not automatically bar all those who do not meet the age
requirements." 44 Fed. Reg. 33,768, 33,778 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90).
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often arise under the normal operation exception: can a program
qualify for that exception if it employs an age distinction in order to
target its scarce resources on persons or groups likely to maximize the
social benefits from the program? The governmentwide regulations
under the ADA are decidedly unclear on this fundamental question.22 6
To be sure, this is a genuinely difficult issue. For instance, age is the
best, and perhaps the only, proxy for likely duration of medical prac-
tice, and likely duration of practice is surely a legitimate consideration
in allocating scarce slots in medical school classes. Suppose that the age
ceiling were 60; could anyone doubt that a school was justified in im-
posing such a limitation? And can one reject the medical school's
policy and at the same time countenance the policy of a job-training
program to target its services on younger workers who will be in the
job force longest? Nevertheless, this line of reasoning does ignore the
value that society places upon individual self-determination and merit.
Moreover, such logic could well be extended to exclude the elderly
from almost all general social programs on the theory that the benefits
they derive will be ephemeral relative to younger persons.
Given these opposing considerations, it is not surprising that reason-
able persons differ on this particular question,2 2 7 and HEW's position
on it is less troubling than is the department's tendency to give short
shrift to efficiency or cost-effectiveness objectives. Because the status
under the ADA of these objectives will arise more frequently in con-
nection with the other reasonableness exceptions, however, it is con-
sidered further below.
226. Id. at 33,773-74 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90). Although the regulations
place their imprimatur on a youth program, id. at 33,773, they withhold it from a
medical school that limits applicants to persons under age 35, id. at 33,773-74. This ap-
parent inconsistency is justified on the ground that while a youth organization may have
as its objective rendition of services to youth, "achieving a high average longevity of
practice for its graduates cannot be considered a program objective for a medical school
within the meaning of the act." Id. at 33,774. The only reason given for this conclusion
is the assertion that the medical school's "basic objectives" are to train competent
graduates, and that these objectives are not impaired if the average duration of its
graduates' practice is somewhat reduced. Id. ("The 'normal operation' exception is not
intended to permit a recipient to use broad notions of efficiency or cost-benefit analysis
to justify exclusion from a program on the basis of age.")
227. Compare Additional Statement by Vice Chairman Stephen Horn of U.S. Comm'n
on Civil Rights, I Ac DISCuMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 52-53 (arguing medical
schools should be permitted to include age as one of many factors in deciding fitness of
applicants) and Memorandum from John Harmon, suPra note 178, at 10 (arguing medical
school policy on age limits should qualify for normal operation exception) with I AGE
DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 39 (majority of U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights
concludes that "except as statutorily prescribed, all present age discrimination policies
uncovered in the study [such as medical school admissions policies] are unreasonable")
and 44 Fed. Reg. 33,773-74 (1979) (HEW maintains medical school policy does not qualify
for exception).
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2. The "Statutory Objective" Exception
Without explanation, the conference committee that fashioned the
ADA added to the normal operation exception in section 304(b)(1)(A)
a clause creating a second exception for any action that "reasonably
takes into account age as a factor necessary to ... the achievement of
any statutory objective of" a program or activity.2 28 The conference
report stated only that the clause was added "to clarify congressional
intent,"229 a rather cryptic and circular reference.
Although the official legislative history ignores the meaning of this
clause, the unofficial history does not. HEW informally had urged the
conference committee staff to insert this exception in order to mitigate
the potential rigor and narrowness of the normal operation excep-
tion.230 HEW sought to address a common problem. Many statutes
require use of age-related policies yet do not specify which groups
should receive particular statutory benefits. In pursuing such statutory
objectives, an agency often targets the program resources on particular
age groups; that strategy reflects the agency's "judgment as to the best
way to accomplish the goal." 23' Most compensatory and special educa-
tion programs, for example, are conducted in the elementary grades
in which they are thought to have their greatest impact,232 yet nothing
in the authorizing legislation so delimits the target population. Be-
cause HEW believed that the normal operation exception was too
restrictive to legitimize those types of actions-age distinctions are not,
strictly speaking, necessary, but result from budgetary constraints-
HEW suggested addition of a clause broadening the exceptions. It was
adopted by the conference in slightly altered form.
233
228. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(A) (1976).
229. CONFERNCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 58.
230. See Memorandum, supra note 98, at 3. The only congressional discussion of this
exception, by Representative Quie, is consistent with HEW's understanding of its pur-
pose: to permit the use of age to target program resources on those groups that can
benefit most from them, where such targeting will further the objectives of the authorizing
legislation. In supporting the conference report, Representative Quie stated:
Thus, in a bill providing grants for the improvement of reading in the elementary
grades, but for which a relatively small sum had been appropriated, the decision could
be made to concentrate the effort on the first three grades even though this dis-
criminates against older children. The basis of the decision would be that otherwise
the objective of the program would be defeated.
121 CONG. REc. 37,299 (1975).
231. See Memorandum, supra note 98, at 3.
232. Id.
233. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 54-55. The conference committee expanded
the exception from the phrase used in the HEW memorandum-"the statutory objective"-
to "any statutory objective." Id. at 55.
The relationship between the "statutory objective" and "normal operation" exceptions
is unclear. The two overlap insofar as many uses of age needed to maintain normal
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 27, 1979
This exception has far-reaching implications for the scope of the
ADA's prohibition. In the typical situation in which program funds
are limited in relation to the resources needed to serve the entire
eligible population,234 administratively applied age distinctions could
be justified any time those uses of age were reasonably thought to be
"necessary to . . . the achievement of any statutory objective." For
example, the tendency of job-training programs to focus their efforts
on younger workers because of their longer remaining working life,
or the targeting of Community Health Center funds on preventive
health programs for children, might be upheld under such a construc-
tion as necessary to maximize the benefits from scarce program funds.
One could advance several arguments against this approach. The
first is that Congress's failure to write age-specific targeting into the
authorizing statute for a particular program should be taken to in-
dicate congressional intent that the use of age classifications not be
permitted.235 That argument, however, eliminates the role of agencies
in interpreting their governing statutes,230 ignores the history of this
clause and its meaning as described in the HEW memorandum, 237 and
deprives the reasonableness criterion in the statutory objective excep-
tion of any independent meaning.
238
operations are also necessary to achieve some statutory objective. An example might be
the limitation of Head Start programs to four- and five-year-olds. Yet the explanation in
the HEW memorandum, coupled with Congress's addition of the second clause, suggests
that the exceptions are not identical. The statutory objective exception should be under-
stood to refer to uses of age with a relatively direct relationship to a statutory objective;
the normal operation exception, to situations in which age is used for management or
operational purposes consistent with, but not required by, the authorizing statute.
Examples of the latter often involve implementing detail that can be derived from the
statutory purpose only through an extended chain of reasoning. The linkage to the
statute authorizing the expenditures will be even more attenuated in cases of covered
"activities" that technically are not "programs," such as the activities of the Boy Scouts
of America as a sub-grantee of a social services agency receiving federal assistance.
Many federally assisted activities are not conducted pursuant to statute and therefore
cannot qualify for the statutory objective exception. Thus, a private medical school that
receives federal funds and imposes an age distinction must either qualify for the normal
operation exception or eliminate its use of age. The relationship between the statutory
objective exception and the exclusion for activities "established under authority of any
law" is also unclear, and the legislative history is silent on the issue.
234. This condition will exist for nearly every government program except the entitle-
ment programs, such as Medicare, Medicaid, Social Security, and Food Stamps, in which
appropriations are required to cover all eligible persons who claim the statutorily defined
benefit or service.
235. See, e.g., I AGa DISCRIMINATION STUDY, supra note 112, at 42.
236. The principle that courts ordinarily will defer to interpretations of statutes by
the agency that administers them, at least with respect to provisions that relate to the
administration of an ongoing program, is well-established. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (citing cases); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc.,
531 F.2d 224, 230 (5th Cir. 1976).
237. See p. 73 supra.
238. The implication to be drawn from Congress's failure to target by age may be
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A second and more troubling objection to this expansive view of the
exception was noted above: 239 such a construction could render the
ADA's prohibition virtually meaningless if program administrators
could employ cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness calculations that would
almost always exclude the elderly because of their lower life ex-
pectancy.2 4
0
That objection, however, is unconvincing. The ADA was not enacted
solely for the benefit of the elderly but for all age groups; an age dis-
tinction that redounds to the detriment of one group (such as the
elderly) must also redound to the benefit of others (such as young
workers). That different groups are competing in a zero sum game 241
with respect to limited program benefits is regrettable but inescapable
in a world of scarce resources. When Congress wishes to limit or pre-
determine the outcome of that competition in order to protect one
age group or another, it can easily do so. In view of the broad wording
of the reasonableness exceptions and the ADA's coverage of all age
groups, however, the ADA should be limited to eliminating the element
of arbitrariness from this competition. Under such a construction of the
exception, a classification would have to "reasonably take into account
age as a factor necessary to" the statutory objective; the tests of reason-
ableness and necessity, individually and taken together, could be
demanding.2 42
Finally, the HEW memorandum and the remarks of Congressman
Quie243 confirm that this exception was designed to clarify that officials
remain free to do what reasonably seems necessary in order to achieve
the purposes of their governing legislation-including targeting limited
resources where they will be most effective. Certainly, no contrary
intent appears in the legislative history. To argue that interpreting
the exception to legitimize many, and perhaps most, age distinctions
would thereby significantly limit the ADA's prohibitory effect is
simply to beg the critical questions: How is age discrimination prop-
erly to be defined? And given that definition, how broadly should
the prohibition sweep? The distinctive characteristics both of age as a
precisely the contrary. When Congress has wished to confine bureaucratic discretion by
imposing distributional formulas or fixed set-asides for particular groups, it has managed
to make its intention clear. See note 280 infra.
239. See p. 72 supra.
240. See I ACE DiscuMINATION STUDY, suPra note 112, at 17.
241. The term refers to a situation in which a gain to A necessarily implies a loss to
B. See 1. VoN NEUMANN & 0. MORGENSTERN, THE THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BE-
HAVIOR 47 (1944).
242. Thus, for example, use of an age ceiling of 65 for a job-training program might
be deemed to qualify under the exception, while a ceiling of 35 might not.
243. See note 230 suP a.
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classificatory criterion and of the ADA as a hybrid form of legislation
imply a relatively limited definition of age discrimination, a definition
that in turn implies an interpretation of the exception under which
relatively few existing uses of age are likely to be prohibited.
The centrality of the cost-effectiveness issue to the meaning of the
exceptions is nowhere acknowledged in the ADA's official legislative
history (except for Quie's remark), and the governmentwide regula-
tions evade the issue as well. The regulations affirm an incontrovertible
principle-that a cost-benefit consideration cannot be the sole justifica-
tion for using an age criterion; to be continued, the criterion must find
validation in one of the statutory exceptions. 244 But the regulations fail
to discuss, much less clarify, a far more consequential issue: the cir-
cumstances under which cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness considera-
tions may in fact justify, or be relevant to, the availability of one of
those exceptions. 245 Furthermore, the single clarification of the statu-
tory exception that the regulations do make-construing "any statutory
objective" to include only a purpose "expressly stated in" a federal,
state, or local statute240-is almost certainly erroneous. Because rela-
tively few statutes proclaim their purposes per se, this crabbed inter-
pretation would exclude age criteria reasonably necessary to achieve
purposes implicit in the statutory scheme as well as purposes explicit
or implicit in the legislative history,247 thereby significantly narrowing
the scope of the exception. The courts should not hesitate to overturn
the HEW interpretation.
24 8
244. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,774 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90).
245. The regulations mention this issue only in connection with the example of
medical school admissions under the "normal operation" exception. See note 226 supra.
246. 44 Fed. Reg. 33,773 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90).
247. The proposed regulations presented an alternative formulation--"any purpose
either expressly stated in the statute or reasonably inferred from its provisions or
legislative history"-as HEW's "preferred interpretation". 43 Fed. Reg. 56,431 (1978).
HEW offered no explanation for its change of heart in the final regulations except that
"legislative history is a broad concept." 44 Fed. Reg. 33,773 (1979) (to be codified at 45
C.F.R. § 90).
248. Reasons for this conclusion include the following: the broader reading of the
exception given by HEW in its memorandum to the conference committee and the
committee's apparent acceptance of that reading (indeed, the Conference further
broadened the exception by changing it to "any statutory objective"), see note 233
supra; the absurdity of not effectuating an objective that is clearly implicit in a statute's
provisions or explicit in its legislative history; HEW's unexplained reversal of its earlier
preference for a broader interpretation; and the traditional judicial duty to look beyond
a statute's express provisions in construing its purposes so as to avoid unjust or foolish
results. The principle that courts will defer to agency interpretations of statutes that
they administer, see note 236 supra, is a qualified one. See Southeastern Community
College v. Davis, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 2369 (1979) (deference is constrained by obligation to
honor clear meaning of statute as revealed by language, purpose, and history). The
principle does not apply to interpretations of phrases that are neither technical nor are
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3. The "Reasonable Factors Other Than Age" Exception
The third ADA exception is concerned not with uses of age distinc-
tions but rather with the use of certain non-age factors. Thus, section
304(b)(1)(B) provides an exception for action otherwise prohibited by
the ADA "if, in the program of activity involved.... the differentiation
made by such action is based upon reasonable factors other than age." 249
The legislative history of the ADA is utterly silent concerning this
exception. 210 Again, however, its source is evident; like the normal
operation exception, its formulation is essentially identical to a statu-
tory exception in the ADEA. 251
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that so long as no dis-
criminatory intent lurks behind the use of a facially neutral factor that
disadvantages particular groups, that use is constitutionally valid. 252
The ADA's reasonable factors other than age exception, like that in
the ADEA, apparently is designed to extend that principle to the
statutory realm.21 3 But which of the many factors other than age are
to be considered reasonable?
The Department of Labor has issued interpretations of the ADEA
exception identifying a number of factors other than age that may
illuminated by the agency's expertise. Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandsten Co., 356 U.S.
481, 498 (1958) (courts retain final authority to interpret statutes); K. DAvIs, TREATISE ON
AaMINIsTRATIvE LAW § 30.09 (1958) (courts interpret statutes except when technical and
nonlegal). Few concepts are more appropriate for judicial construction than that of
"statutory objective".
249. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1) (1976).
250. The provision was in the earliest versions of the bill and remained unchanged.
The HEW memorandum of Oct. 25, 1975, contains only a brief discussion of the excep-
tion. See Memorandum, supra note 98, at 5-6.
251. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(l) (1976). A related exception is contained in the Equal Pay
Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976), which prohibits sex discrimination in wage levels,
"except where such payment is made pursuant to . . . (iv) a differential based on any
factor other than sex." See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 205 (1974)
(exception unavailable for differential that, although not based on sex, reflected market
reality that women would work at same job for lower pay).
252. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 2291, 2296 (1979) (upholding
veteran's preference statute benefiting overwhelmingly male class); see Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (evaluation of job applicants through written test that
had disproportionate adverse effect upon black applicants does not, without more, violate
equal protection clause).
253. Even facially neutral factors may violate a statute designed to limit the use of such
factors in the absence of adequate justification. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
246-48 (1976) (Title VII calls for more probing judicial review of and less deference to
seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 433-36 (1971) (Title VII does not preclude testing or measuring procedures,
but does proscribe giving them controlling force unless demonstrably reasonable measure
of job performance). Regulations issued under Title IX essentially adopt the Title VII
test. See 45 C.F.R. § 86.21(b)(2) (1978) (requiring validation by defendant of facially
neutral admissions criteria that have "disproportionately adverse effect on persons on
the basis of sex").
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qualify as reasonable so long as they are job-related and are applied on
an individualized basis rather than on the basis of any "general or
class concept." 254 However, some court decisions construing the ex-
ception have contradicted the department's interpretations,255 holding
that the ADEA's exception permits employers under certain circum-
stances to take into account in hiring and discharge decisions direct
cost considerations such as salary and benefit levels that militate dis-
proportionately against older workers.2 56 In view of the strong correla-
tion that often exists between the age of a worker and a higher direct
cost relative to younger workers, such holdings are potentially signif-
icant.
257
Because some services covered by the ADA are certainly more costly
to provide to some age groups than to other groups, 258 such holdings,
254. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 860.103-.104 (1978). Examples of such factors include physical
fitness, productivity, educational level, performance on validated employee tests, and
antinepotism rules.
255. See Note, supra note 220, at 572 n.34 (citing cases). Compare Marshall v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 590-92 (5th Cir. 1978) (prima facie showing under ADEA
shifts burden of producing evidence to employer, but employee retains burden of persua-
sion that age was determining factor) and Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313
(6th Cir. 1975) (same) with Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1114 (8th Cir.
1977) (establishment of prima facie case shifts burden to employer) and Marshall v.
Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715, 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (burden of persuasion shifts
after prima facie showing under ADEA, as under Title VII) and 44 Fed. Reg. 33,783
(1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90.16) (governmentwide regulations under ADA shift
burden of proof to defendant). In Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., the Court
reasoned that the "reasonable factors other than age" exception and the BFOQ exception
are different, both because the BFOQ is an affirmative defense and because "establish-
ment of a BFOQ necessarily has an effect beyond the case being litigated since it permits
an employer to deal with an entire class of persons on an age-related basis in derogation
of the statute." 576 F.2d at 591 n.3.
Marshall also recognized a distinction between the concepts of discrimination under
Title VI and under the ADEA, such that certain actions that have an adverse impact on
the elderly do not raise the same inference of invidious discrimination as would the same
actions directed at a racial minority. Id. at 591-92.
256. Compare Mastie v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1318 (E.D. Mich.
1976) (ADEA does not require employees to retain older workers at economic loss) and
Donnelly v. Exxon Research & Eng'r Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 417, 422 (D.N.D. 1974),
aff'd mem., 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975) (same) with 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1978) (pro-
hibiting age-based classifications of workers as group for purpose of comparing costs) and
Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715. 728 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (sound business
judgment cannot include age as important factor in discharging employees).
In Mastie, the Court found that the regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1978), permitted
the employer to consider cost factors "where such consideration is predicated upon an
individual as opposed to a general assessment that the older worker's cost of employment
is greater than for other workers." 424 F. Supp. at 316-19. See O'Donnell, Lasser &
Bailor, supra note 197, at 22 & nn.133-34 (discussing Mastie). Indeed, the Department of
Labor itself appears to be inconsistent on this issue. Id. at n.134 (regulations, 29 C.F.R.
§ 860 (1978), do not contain statement explicitly prohibiting employer from considering
actual cost of employing individual).
257. See Note, supra note 220, at 573 n.36, 575-76.
258. See note 221 supra (citing examples).
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if adopted under the ADA exception, could narrow the scope of the
ADA's prohibition.2 59 The use of differential cost factors, however, is
only one manifestation of a much broader phenomenon that must
shape the interpretation of this exception under the ADA: in the
course of conducting federally assisted programs, administrators rou-
tinely and inescapably use myriad factors other than age, virtually all
of which have differential age-specific impacts, often to a marked
degree. A liberal construction of this exception 26 would not imply that
such factors could never be deemed unreasonable; thus the use of a
facially neutral factor with an intent to discriminate on the basis of age
should not qualify for the exception. 261 Rather, such a construction
would simply reflect the fact that differential age-specific impacts are
ubiquitous and inevitable in the real world, and that a more restrictive
reading of the exception, as the Supreme Court admonished in an
analogous context, "would raise serious questions about, and perhaps
invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory,
and licensing statutes . .,.22 Certainly, neither the language nor the
legislative history of the ADA suggests that Congress intended such
an extreme result.2
63
Notwithstanding these considerations, the governmentwide regula-
tions under the ADA construe the exception far more narrowly, re-
quiring that a non-age factor, in order to be sustained, must bear a
259. One may well argue, of course, that regardless of the manner in which the ADEA
counterpart is interpreted, the ADA exception should not be construed to embrace such
cost considerations because a taxpayer bears a very different relationship to the govern-
ment with respect to tax-supported services than an employee bears to his employer with
respect to a particular job. In this view, the differential cost of serving different eligible
citizens is not an appropriate criterion for a transaction perceived as more properly based
upon moral than upon economic considerations. Similar questions will arise under the
other ADA exceptions.
260. See pp. 35-37 supra.
261. While the problem of inferring intent to discriminate is a complex one, see Fiss,
supra note 35, at 290-310, a close analogy is available in the opportunity of employees in
Title VII or ADEA cases to show that, although the employer adopted a nondiscrimina-
tory policy, it was in fact a pretext or was disciiminatorily applied. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973) (worker must be afforded fair oppor-
tunity to prove employer's stated reason was pretext for racially discriminatory decision);
Note, supra note 220, at 578-81. In the ADA context, a finding of pretext should render
unavailable the "reasonable factors other than age" exception.
262. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). For this reason, the Department of
Justice has construed the exception to permit the use of cost-benefit considerations
resulting in age-specific disproportionate impacts. Memorandum from John Harmon,
sup.ra note 178, at 12-13.
263. See p. 77 supra. Congress could, if it chose, invalidate the use of factors that
caused such impacts; in Title VII and the ADEA, for example, it has done so with
respect to certain employment practices not justified by business necessity. See Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (prohibiting employment practice with
exclusionary effect if unrelated to job performance).
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"direct and substantial relationship" to the normal operation of a
program or activity or to the achievement of a statutory objective.
26 4
This standard, stricter than the rational relationship standard that
HEW originally preferred, is one under which, HEW has acknowl-
edged, "many 'factors other than age' having a differential impact on
persons of particular ages might not be permitted to continue. -20 5 This
interpretation is remarkable not only because it calls into question
numerous classificatory factors employed rationally and in good faith
but also because it is contrary to the clear statutory language.266
IV. The Process, Substance, and Form of Age Discrimination Policy
To examine the gestation of age discrimination policy under the
ADA is to glimpse the shadows cast by the elusive interaction of
problem definition, institutional and political behavior, and legal
forms. The spectacle is not a heartening one. The ADA, I have sug-
gested, was conceived with two important genetic defects. First, there
was a conceptual failure to define appropriately the nature and extent
of the social problem to which the ADA was a response. That problem
might have been characterized in a number of ways-for example, as
one of invidious bias against certain age groups on the part of decision-
makers; of innocently held but persistent age-related stereotypes; of
an inequitable distribution of resources generally among age groups;
or of some more limited distributional inequity in particular pro-
grams. As we have seen, however, Congress and HEW neglected to
provide even a clue as to the nature of the evil in question. Second,
there was a failure on the part of policymaking and policy-informing
institutions to discharge their most elementary responsibilities.
These two failures were, of course, interrelated and mutually rein-
forcing. The definition of a policy problem is not merely an in-
tellectual activity, it is also part of a political process characterized by
conflict, cooperation, consensus-building and, as the ADA demonstrates,
more than a little confusion. Like a river fed by tributaries and con-
trolled by dams, a social policy results from the confluence of many
forces-political, social, intellectual, bureaucratic-mediated through
formal institutions: Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts.
Democratic theory and practice endow these institutions with dis-
264. See 44 Fed. Reg. 33,777 (1979) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 90.15).
265. 43 Fed. Reg. 56,433 (1978).
266. The statute provides an exception for "reasonable factors other than age." 42
U.S.C. § 6103(b)(1)(B) (1976) (emphasis supplied).
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tinctive roles based upon both the constitutional sources of their power
and the distinctive competencies that are imputed to them.2 67 In this
view, Congress makes fundamental political choices not only because
it is most directly accountable to the electorate, the ultimate source of
legitimacy, but also because it possesses significant institutional capaci-
ties for informing choice and effecting compromise.2 6  Executive
agencies, although they share many of Congress's capacities to formu-
late policy, respond to a different array of political influences and con-
stituencies than does the Congress. 26 9 To this difference is added others:
the more bureaucratic character of the executive establishment;2 70 its
greater familiarity with the operational details of programs; the rela-
tively low visibility of its activities; and its responsibilities for trans-
lating generalized legislative policies into specific governmental activi-
ties, including the actual delivery of services and benefits.
These overlapping competencies and highly disparate political and
program perspectives define the pattern of conflict and cooperation
between Congress and the Executive Branch in the development of
social policy. That pattern is constantly evolving and reflects the
exigencies of individual circumstances, political factors, the influence of
particular personalities, and the specialized nature of the policy issues
in question.
267. See THE FaiDERALIST No. 47 (J. Madison).
268. Thus, Congress can develop policy without the necessity for a statutory or
litigational pretext. See Johannes, Congress and the Initiation of Legislation, 20 PUB.
POL'Y 281 (1972); Moe & Teel, Congress as Policymaker, 85 POLITICAL Sc. Q. 443 (1970).
It possesses highly developed, specialized organs for gathering, processing, and evaluating
information. See J. HARRIS, CONCRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 79-90, 249-98
(1964) (information secured through investigations, appropriations, authorizations). Its
mode of deliberation and decisionmaking facilitates the weighing of competing values;
the consideration of alternatives, see J. HAVEMANN, CONGRESS AND THE BuDnr 200-08
(1978); the registering of intensity of preferences, see J. BUCHANAN & G. TuLLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSErr 119-42 (1962); and the reconsideration of decisions previously made.
It can monitor and influence the implementation of its decisions. See C. HYNEMAN,
BUREAUCRACY IN A DEMOCRACY (1950); M. OGUL, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE BUREAUCRACY
(1976); MacMahon, Congressional Oversight of Administration, 58 POLITICAL SCI. Q. 161-
190, 380-414 (1943). Finally, its responsibility for both raising public revenues and for
appropriating public expenditures enjoins a sensitivity to the costs, as well as the bene-
fits, of public policies. See R. FENNO, THE POWER OF THE PURSE (1966) (study of appro-
priations in Congress); A. SCHICK, THE FIRST YEARS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS
(1976) (examining impact of budget process on policymaking). Indeed, this sensitivity is
often so great that Congress contrives in a variety of ways to conceal the costs from the
public.
269. See Maass, System Design and the Political Process, in DESIGN OF WATER RESOURCE
SYSTEMs 577-84 (A. Maass, M. Hufschmidt, R. Dorfman, H. Thomas, S. Marglin, & G.
Fair ed. 1962) (Congress and executive compared).
270. But see H. Fox & S. HAMMOND, CONGRESSIONAL STAFFS 12-25 (1977) (discussion of
growth of congressional bureaucracy); Malbin, Congressional Staffs: Who's in Charge
Here? 47 PUB. INTEREST 16 (1977) (same).
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Yet this matrix of institutional relationships, flexible and com-
modious as it is, does not adequately describe the process by which the
ADA actually developed. In fact, Congress performed few of the con-
ventional policymaking functions for which it is thought to be ad-
mirably designed: it failed to specify the problem; it gathered little in-
formation; it failed to articulate and weigh competing values or reduce
them to operational terms; it considered no alternatives; and it declined
to make hard choices. Having neglected to define the problem, Con-
gress designed a legislative solution that, by reason of its singular in-
determinacy, seemed consistent with any number of possible problem
definitions. It adopted a sweeping nondiscrimination provision, then
riddled it with exceptions and exclusions. These exceptions and ex-
clusions appeared to be designed to afford broad scope for precisely
the kinds of allocative criteria-age classifications-that the nondis-
crimination provision flatly condemned.
Although the legislative history does not indicate that Congress was
even aware of the tensions and contradictions between these two ap-
proaches or of the implications of combining them, one may hazard a
guess as to its motivation in proceeding as it did. The analogies to
previous civil rights legislation evoked symbolic and rhetorical associa-
tions that few legislators were inclined to resist. To have done so would
have required them to articulate some unpopular truths: that apart
from the employment area where the ADEA already existed, the
elderly in general have less need of special legal protection than do
racial minorities; that most of what the Civil Rights Commission
was later to characterize as age discrimination appeared instead to
represent nothing more sinister than a series of difficult, but good-
faith, judgments about how scarce resources could best be stretched
in pursuit of social objectives; 271 that such judgments in many, per-
haps most, cases could best be made by resort to age criteria; that
without increases in resources, gains to the elderly would simply be
at the expense of other age groups; and that, accordingly, the evil of
age discrimination required a far more limited and refined legislative
response than did that of race discrimination.
27 2 With the notable
exception of Senator Eagleton, however, no legislator was prepared
271. For example, the hearings and public comments that preceded the promulgation
of governmentwide regulations under the ADA unearthed few examples of de jure age
discrimination that were not, at least on their face, reasonable. Telephone conversation
with Gene Lyons, HEW Office of General Counsel, July 31, 1979 (notes on file with
Yale Law Journal).
272. This inability or unwillingness to acknowledge that race is "different" appears
to be endemic to HEW's Office of Civil Rights as well. See J. Rabkin, HEW's Office of
Civil Rights 38 (1979) (unpublished manuscript).
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even to acknowledge the existence of such realities, much less to con-
sider their implications.
In theory, the policymaking process ensures that such contradictions
and implications will at least surface and be explored, if not resolved.
It does so by encouraging interests potentially disadvantaged by pend-
ing legislation to make their concerns known to Congress and the
Executive Branch. In the case of the ADA, those interests consisted
primarily of the beneficiaries of federally assisted programs, individuals
whose participation might be jeopardized if, without an increase in
program resources, the participation by members of some other age
groups were increased due to the ADA's strictures against age discrimi-
nation. In the real world, of course, the notion that, say, CETA job-
holders in their teens and twenties would perceive the very real threat
to their CETA benefits posed by a ruling that a larger share of CETA
job slots go to the elderly,2 73 and would organize politically to resist it,
is fanciful. For that reason, HEW and, to a lesser extent, other agencies
constituted proxies for such interests. In addition, however, these
agencies had their own political and policy interests in defending the
way in which they and their grantees distribute their resources and
administer their programs. 274 They also had an interest in helping to
define the problem, in pointing out the implications of the proposed
legislation, in offering alternative approaches, and in otherwise pre-
cipitating consideration of important issues.
The process, however, broke down. With Congress apparently de-
termined to continue stumbling about in the dark, the Executive
Branch chose not to help it find its way. From an inadvertent be-
ginning early in 1975 to the amendment of the ADA late in 1978,
HEW played an insignificant and wholly reactive role in the design
of the legislation, 275 a role that Congress did nothing to magnify. As
a result, the ADA was enacted by a Congress operating in a vacuum
273. The position of the Civil Rights Commission on the reasonableness of CETA's
existing policies, HEW's narrow construction of the "statutory objective" and "reason-
able factors other than age" exceptions, and the availability of a private cause of action
to challenge the existing distribution of job slots, suggest the reality of the threat.
274. To recognize that HEW has such an interest is not to suggest that it necessarily
wishes to-or should-maintain the status quo. Quite the contrary. It is only to acknowl-
edge that it matters-or should matter-to HEW whether such decisions are made by
means of an allocative model or a nondiscrimination model, and what the substantive
outcomes are.
275. The reasons for this passivity appear to have included division within HEW on
the issue, fear of the political consequences of appearing to oppose the interests of the
elderly, a sense of futility about influencing a House Committee dominated by Representa-
tive Brademas, and normal internal confusion. Telephone interview with Bill Morrill,
former Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, HEV, May 9, 1979 (notes on
file with Yale Law Journal).
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of information concerning the nature of the problem, its magnitude,
the likely effect of the ADA, and the existence of many alternative
approaches to the problem.
2 70
Indeed, the Administration failed until 1978 to take even the most
obvious first steps toward designing a sensible policy on age discrimina-
tion, such as developing an inventory of the ways in which age was in
fact used in federally assisted activities. 277 As of mid-1979, the Admin-
istration still had not developed a definition of age discrimination that
could be made operational in the context of federally assisted activities,
much less determined the extent to which age discrimination actually
existed in such activities.
Even when HEW promulgated the governmentwide regulations
under the ADA in June 1979, it failed to address several of the most
fundamental issues, while resolving others in ways that would increase,
rather than reduce, uncertainty as to what laws, policies, and practices
might violate the Act.
278
But just as these congressional and Executive Branch abdications
assured that questions of problem definition and appropriateness of
remedy would go unanswered-indeed, unasked-the conceptual con-
fusion concerning the nature of age discrimination encouraged those
abdications. Having conceived of the problem as one of "ageism" lead-
ing to the arbitrary exclusion of the elderly from publicly supported
benefits, Congress naturally turned to a familiar legislative remedy for
such injustices-the nondiscrimination model of group protection based
upon the Title VI analogy. Apparently sensing that this analogy was
inapt, however, Congress also gave broad scope to the allocative model
by creating broad exceptions and exclusions that countenance the
widespread use of age as a classificatory criterion.
Combining these models is not necessarily logically inconsistent; a
rule that age criteria shall not be used unless a rational justification
can be demonstrated is not self-contradictory. To combine them in-
advertently, however, is to set policy adrift from its moorings in con-
sidered choice, for each model generates distinctive tendencies and
implications that are at war with one another.
276. See pp. 42-49, 55-59 supra.
277. Indeed, fully three years after the ADA was enacted, the Secretary of HEW could
still proudly announce that he was taking "an essential first step: to find out whether and
how age discrimination exists in laws and official policies." Prepared remarks of Joseph
A. Califano, Jr., to the National Journal Conference on the Economics of Aging, at 12
(Nov. 30, 1978).
278. Certainly Congress's adoption of the private cause of action provision, see note 8
supra, coupled with the advocacy and litigation capacity of the aging groups, seems
admirably designed to increase the leverage of those groups over the allocation process.
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First, the nondiscrimination model creates a legal right formulated
as an abstract rule: no person shall be subjected to discrimination on
the basis of age. At least in its pure form, the rule brooks neither
qualification nor compromise. Because it is usually linked to notions
of fundamental human dignity, a right to be free of discrimination
evokes powerful convictions of an entitlement immune to limitation
at the instance of anyone other than its possessor. Such rights are often
established only after a protracted struggle in which numerous political
and ideological obstacles are overcome by insisting upon the absolute
nature and primacy of the basic human values that underlie the rights.
Although the ADA required no such struggle, its identification with
the tradition of civil rights legislation produced the same ideological
momentum toward the establishment of unconditional legal rights, a
momentum that very nearly succeeded in eliminating the reason-
ableness exceptions and exclusions from the law in the 1978 amend-
ments and actually succeeded in significantly narrowing the exceptions
through the governmentwide regulations issued under the ADA. Not
surprisingly, then, a right to be free of discrimination tends to be
difficult to adjust or limit; the invocation of prudential or political
considerations arguing in favor of change can easily appear to repudiate
the underlying values.
In contrast, the allocative model rarely creates legal entitlements in
individuals.279 Instead, it shapes the exercise of bureaucratic discretion
by prescribing distributional criteria to be applied by officials.2 0
Where the nondiscrimination model seeks primarily to vindicate
abstract principles resistant to compromise or piecemeal implementa-
tion, the allocative model concerns itself primarily with the distribu-
tion of resources according to criteria that, by often permitting flexi-
bility and judgment in their application, encourage bargained and
incremental solutions.2 8 1
279. The so-called entitlement programs, however, do create such a right in those who
meet the eligibility conditions. See, e.g., The Food Stamp Act of 1977, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014
(1978) (all persons at a certain income level can claim benefits).
280. The criteria for "entitlement" programs, for example, are usually quite detailed.
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1976) (defining in detail income definition standards for
disabled, aged, or blind individuals seeking entitlement to benefits). Geographical dis-
tribution formulas also tend to be quite specific. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 241(a) (1976)
(allocating funds to local educational agencies in school attendance areas with high
concentrations of children from low-income families). Even programs that establish vague
criteria at the federal level usually require that detailed allocative standards be developed
at the state or local level. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (1976) (requiring states to devise
detailed standards in Medicaid program).
281. Questions of resource allocation possess far more natural "trading points" than
questions of principle. See T. SCHELLING, TnE STRATEGY oF CONFLICt 21-80 (1960) (examin-
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Second, the two models differ in the form of their commands. The
nondiscrimination model is wholly prohibitory. It neither instructs
the person to whom the command is directed what to do or how to do
it, nor in any way defines his task or identifies the factors or objectives
that should inform his exercise of discretion. Instead, it simply in-
structs him that he may not take a particular fact or attribute into
account in making decisions authorized and governed by other
statutes. In contrast, the allocative model is characteristically affirma-
tive: it directs the official to distribute resources and take other posi-
tive actions in pursuit of specified objectives, while defining the
criteria that must shape exercises of discretion. Accordingly, it im-
plicitly (and often explicitly) reveals both the political choices that
animated it and at least the first-order distributional effects that it
proposes to generate.
Third, the nondiscrimination model covers an extraordinarily broad
range of activities and relationships-for example, all federally assisted
programs in the cases of Title VI, section 504, and the ADA. This
vast sweep is only possible because of the generality of its nondiscrimi-
nation rule and its prohibitory form. The allocative model, however,
is employed to address a discrete problem or condition, such as in-
adequate housing for low-income people or the nutritional needs of the
elderly. Thus, the criteria of choice that it prescribes and the zones of
discretion that it creates are marked by relatively clear boundaries.
Accordingly, the task of agencies and courts in interpreting nondis-
crimination laws tends to be more difficult, more controversial, and
necessitates more fundamental policy choices, than in the case of
allocative laws.
Finally, the nondiscrimination model often can achieve redistribu-
tive effects in ways that neither are obvious to the public nor require
the creation of a grant program. Section 504, for example, does not
direct anyone to do anything, much less divert resources from the
nonhandicapped to the handicapped; it simply prohibits discrimina-
tion on the basis of handicap. Yet the effect of that law, if enforced,
almost certainly will be to increase the level of resources flowing to the
handicapped. In contrast, the allocative model's distributional objec-
ing distributional aspects of bargaining); Schuck, Litigation, Bargaining and Regulation,
REGULATION, July/Aug. 1979, at 26-34 (analyzing relative merits of adjudication and
bargaining as regulatory decision mechanisms). If, for example, a nondiscrimination rule
prohibits age from being considered in assigning job-training slots, it is difficult to see
how that principle can be compromised. If, on the other hand, a job-training program
is being created or funded, it is a relatively simple matter to reach a bargained determina-
tion to earmark a certain portion of the slots for particular age groups.
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tives are explicit and therefore likely to be controversial. This
particular attribute of nondiscrimination laws appears to have been
very much on the mind of the ADA's chief congressional sponsor,
Representative Brademas, who stressed during the final stages of de-
bate on the conference report that the legislation "has the potential
of providing substantial additional services and benefits to the elderly
without establishing a single new program or requiring additional
program funding. ' 28 2 In short, the use of a nondiscrimination model
rather than an allocative model relieves Congress of the political risks
of having explicitly to allocate scarce resources among competing
groups, to raise additional resources by taxation, or to expand the
federal budget. It also generates political benefits for Congress with
the protected group and has the appearance of benefiting all members
of the public equally. The political virtues of such an approach are
obvious.
These characteristic differences in the models suggest that the
decision to employ one model or the other, or, in the case of the ADA,
to adopt elements of both, is likely to be an important judgment en-
tailing significant legal and policy consequences. Each model is ap-
propriate for addressing particular kinds of social problems. Other
things being equal, the nondiscrimination model will be most effec-
tive when there is reason to believe that decisionmakers are either
biased or governed by false stereotypes with respect to a particular fact
or attribute, and there is no legitimate reason to consider that fact or
attribute in making regulatory or allocative decisions.28 3 Moreover,
two features of the nondiscrimination model-its ability to sustain
political momentum through its powerful symbolism and resistance to
change, and the low-visibility of its potentially far-reaching redistribu-
tive effects-commend it to groups that seek respite from the conven-
tional social and political processes by which limited resources are
allocated among competing social needs. 2 4 By escaping the competi-
tive constraints of those processes, such a group can hope to reaffirm
the primacy of the nondiscrimination principle, reduce or eliminate
the discretion of unsympathetic decisionmakers, and maximize the flow
of resources to its members.
282. See note 103 supra.
283. Other considerations bearing upon the model's appropriateness and effectiveness
in any particular instance include the difficulty in proving discriminatory purpose, the
social consequences of adopting a disproportionate-impact criterion of discrimination, and
the distributional consequences of eliminating the discrimination.
284. For a discussion of this phenomenon with respect to Title VI, Title IX, and
§ 504, see J. Rabkin, sukra note 272, at 41-44.
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The allocative model, on the other hand, is best suited to address
problems that cannot properly be resolved by resort to a preexisting,
impersonal, general rule. Such problems implicate a number of com-
peting, highly interdependent, and frequently changing ends whose
weights are neither static nor objectively determined.28 5 The allocative
model assumes that those ends must be balanced and compromised
through a flexible, cybernetic, contingent, and ultimately political
process. It assumes that such a process cannot be reduced to abstract
rules or to fixed definitions of need, but must instead be free to take
account of many considerations and different indices of need. Most
significant policy questions with which legislators and administrative
agencies grapple are essentially of this kind; growing social com-
plexity and interdependence are probably increasing their incidence
and importance.
To contrast the nondiscrimination and allocative models, however,
is not to suggest that these remedies and the problem definitions that
they reflect are mutually exclusive. 28 6 Comparison of the two models
is intended only to suggest that the choice of statutory form generates
important consequences that in the case of the ADA were never con-
sidered by the principal policymaking institutions.
On the basis of the evidence produced in the congressional hearings,
the Civil Rights Commission study, and HEW's administrative hear-
ings on the governmentwide regulations, one is forced to the following
conclusion: if federal policy fails to adequately protect and advance
the interests of the elderly-a question well outside the scope of this
Article2 7 -that failure is not because of any significant pattern of
"ageism" on the part of federal officials or federal grantees but instead
285. For a discussion of the suitability of various decisionmaking processes in resolving
such problems, see Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353,
394-409 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Adjudication]; Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and
Functions, 44 So. CAL. L. REv. 305, 334-37 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Mediation]. For an
exploration of related issues, see Eisenberg, Participation, Responsiveness, and the Con-
sultative Process: An Essay for Lon Fuller, 92 HARV. L. Rav. 410, 423-26 (1978).
286. As discussed above, a nondiscrimination law that effectively reduces the effects of
bias in the provision of housing, jobs, or other social benefits will certainly affect the
distribution of such benefits. See p. 87 supra. Indeed, many of the proponents of the
ADA supported it precisely because of its presumed redistributive effects. See 121 CoNG.
REc. 37,297 (1975) (remarks of Rep. Brademas). A statute that increases the distribution
of such benefits to certain groups could well dissolve inaccurate stereotypes, thereby
reducing the amount of bias suffered by them.
287. An answer would require that this question be formulated more precisely. Even
in that event, it would depend at a minimum upon numerous value judgments con-
cerning, for example, the "correct" level of total resources allocated by tax, expenditure,
and regulatory decisions of government; the share of those resources that "ought" to go
to the elderly; and the "needs" of the elderly.
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reflects the fact that society has chosen to allocate its resources in ways
that do not adequately meet the needs of that group.
If Congress, having judged that a problem did indeed exist, had
concluded that it lay not in "ageism" but in inadequate program
benefits to the elderly, numerous allocative options would have been
available to it. Taking into account the needs and capacities of
particular age groups, as well as any political considerations that it
deemed relevant, Congress could have decided that certain age groups
had not received an appropriate share of benefits in certain federally
assisted programs and that it wished to increase that share. Once the
problem had been defined in this way, Congress could have affirma-
tively addressed it by directing that such benefits be allocated on the
basis of need as defined by whatever criteria Congress deemed appro-
priate for measuring that need. Numerous conventional statutory
mechanisms consistent with any level of fiscal constraint were available
for this purpose.28 8 To have used these allocative approaches would
not have foreclosed the additional and complementary option of adopt-
ing a nondiscrimination law limited to discrete practices, such as age-
limited medical school admissions practices, thought to be invidious.28 9
Congress, for reasons suggested above, rejected such refined, targeted,
problem-oriented approaches in favor of the peculiar hybrid that con-
stitutes the ADA. What consequences can be expected to flow from its
choice? Although the most important effects of the ADA, as of any
social reform, may well be those that cannot now be anticipated,
several predictions may nevertheless be ventured. First, the ADA is
likely to increase the proportion of total program resources allocated
to the elderly. If Congress may be said to have had any single coherent
expectation in enacting the ADA, it was that the elderly would receive
a larger share of program benefits in a world free of "ageism." But if
288. If Congress were prepared to create new programs or authorize additional ex-
penditures, it could have enacted programs targeted on the elderly or increased the ap-
propriations under existing programs. Alternatively, it could have earmarked a certain
percentage of existing general program funds to be spent on the elderly, directed program
administrators to spend more of the existing funds on the elderly, or increased the funding
of programs for the elderly while reducing other programs by a like amount. See M.
Kmsr, GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PASSING Laws 62-88 (1965) (discussing statutory and non-
statutory devices for allocating resources).
289. Examples of such nondiscrimination laws already enacted include the Compre-
hensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act
of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4581(a) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination in admission or treatment
of alcohol abusers or alcoholics by federally assisted hospitals or outpatient facilities
solely because of individual's alcohol abuse or alcoholism) and the Drug Abuse Office and
Treatment Act of 1972, 21 U.S.C. § 1174(a) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination in admission
or treatment of drug abusers by federally assisted hospitals solely because of individual's
drug abuse or drug dependence).
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resource levels remain unchanged, increases for the elderly will be at
the expense of members of every other age group. One can anticipate,
then, that the ADA will tend to intensify conflict and friction between
age groups in their pursuit of public and private benefits.
290
Second, whatever redistribution occurs between age groups as a
result of the ADA is likely to be relatively random compared to that
effected by an allocative law. Redistribution through nondiscrimina-
tion laws is not the result of affirmative, problem-oriented, visible
choices by Congress or agencies. Rather it is a consequence of relatively
low-visibility actions reflecting decisions not to consider certain factors.
In the case of the ADA, such actions generally will be taken by
bureaucrats and by courts in spasmodic fashion as groups challenge
particular uses of age or particular distributional patterns induced by
the use of non-age factors. In contrast, under an allocative law, such
actions will be taken in relatively routinized fashion as part of an on-
going program.
Third, one can anticipate that the cost effectiveness of some social
programs will decline as program managers feel obliged (1) to serve
more elderly and fewer younger people in situations in which the
former are more costly to serve, or less likely to benefit, than the latter;
(2) to abandon age criteria in favor of other criteria that less accurately
measure the characteristic for which age was a proxy, or that measure
it only at greater cost; and (3) to undertake costly new data collection
activities in order to identify the age composition of their beneficiary
populations, necessitating (in the absence of a budget increase) a cor-
responding reduction of actual services. 291 Whether such consequences,
290. One can well imagine that an action to increase the level of program services to
the elderly could generate litigation on behalf of children's groups contending that an
age criterion has been used to deprive children of their "fair share" of services in viola-
tion of the ADA. In such a case, program officials would be in a position similar to that
of employers subjected to employment discrimination claims by different minority groups.
Cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Attorney General et al., [1979] 19 Lab. Rel. Rep. [19 Fair
Empl. Prac. Gas.] 916 (dismissing complaint contending that attempts by federal govern-
ment to extend special legal protections to numerous groups simultaneously through civil
rights laws unconstitutionally subjects employers to mutually inconsistent constraints).
It is also possible that this increased competition between age groups will generate an
increase in the total resources expended in federally assisted social programs. If the share
going to the elderly is increased, other age groups can be expected to vigorously resist a
decline in "market share" by pressing for "hold harmless" treatment.
The author's observation, confirmed by others with policymaking experience, is that
the condition of Pareto optimality-the condition that any change will leave no person
worse off than he or she was before-is rarely violated in the case of policy changes likely
to have clearly visible redistributive effects. Should these efforts succeed, the increases
would relax the resource constraint somewhat and might restrict the elderly to their
present share. Whether this would moderate the intergroup conflict or simply encourage
more intense advocacy and conflict is unclear. Certainly, the supply of program resources
will, under any conceivable set of circumstances, remain far below demand.
291. See note 160 sutra.
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on balance, are to be regarded as desirable or not is of course a norma-
tive judgment upon which reasonable persons may differ.
Fourth, the ADA will generate much programmatic uncertainty,
magnified in some important respects by HEW's governmentwide
regulations. In light of those regulations, it is not altogether clear, for
example, that CETA, job training, vocational education, and other
such programs may maintain their present policies of concentrating
funds upon persons in their prime working years, or that social service
agencies may continue to devote the vast majority of federal day-care
funds to children, rather than to adults in need of day care. In view of
the stakes and the ADA's incentives for litigation, it would be sur-
prising if legal and political conflicts did not erupt over these and
similar issues. Again, whether changes in the age composition of the
population served by particular programs are desirable depends
upon one's point of view. But few social programs will be immune
from the threat of challenges to their most basic policies, policies that
in many cases represent the hard-won fruits of earlier reform struggles.
The final and perhaps most far-reaching consequence to be an-
ticipated relates to the effect of the ADA and the governmentwide
regulations upon the manner in which, and the institutions by whom,
decisions concerning the allocation of resources in federally assisted
programs will be made. A number of considerations, taken together,
strongly suggest that although the Act reposes primary regulatory and
enforcement authority in the departments and agencies, the courts also
will perform a central policymaking role under the ADA. To begin
with, the governmentwide regulations neither significantly specify the
vague statutory language, nor resolve critical legal and policy issues
such as the status of cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness considerations
justifying the use of age criteria.292 Such issues will perforce be resolved
by the courts. Moreover, individual agencies, in issuing and enforcing
agency-specific ADA regulations, will surely characterize their existing
distributional patterns and policies as eminently reasonable under one
or more of the exceptions. In this event, the powerful incentives for
private litigation added by the 1978 amendments will enable those
dissatisfied with program policies to carry their arguments into a new,
perhaps more sympathetic forum.
The prospect of judicial supervision over federal, state, and local
agency decisions about appropriate program policies and resource al-
locations is troubling. Whether the agency is determining the extent
to which it should target CETA job-training funds on teenagers or
292. See pp. 75-76 sutra.
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senior citizens, which mix of services Community Mental Health
Centers should provide, what age groups an adoption agency should
concentrate on placing, or what the office hours of a local social service
agency should be,293 the agency will be confronting problems of a type
addressed most appropriately by the kind of pragmatic process intrinsic
to the allocative model.
294
By encouraging courts to resolve such problems, we invite failure.
Without decision rules to look to, without a methodology for identi-
fying appropriate criteria or assigning them appropriate weights, courts
will be cast adrift on a sea of discretion. Constrained by procedural
norms that hobble their ability to trace out the effects of interde-
pendencies, to adjust to changes in the environment, or to develop
political consensus on behalf of a solution, their decisions are unlikely
to constitute sound policy. Under such circumstances, courts will tend
to pursue one of two courses, or worse yet, they may pursue both
simultaneously. Lacking the tools to perform the task at hand, a court
may simply transform the problem into one that it can handle by
radically simplifying the reality in which the problem is rooted and
redefining it as one that can be resolved by recourse to a preexisting
rule.295 The nondiscrimination model encourages the search for such
a rule, and Title VI law will remain a seductive analogy from which
the rule's substantive content can be derived.2 96 Alternatively, courts
293. If these examples seem far-fetched, note that Secretary Califano, in issuing the
governmentwide regulations, stated:
The Act and these regulations seek to root out subtle as well as obvious discrimina-
tion. For example, the hours that a facility operates or the kind of services a program
offers may determine the age groups who use the program. If these decisions have an
adverse effect on persons of a particular age, they will not be permitted unless they
are fully justified.
Statement of Joseph A. Califano, Jr., June 5, 1979, at 7.
294. Those situations in which the allocative model is more appropriate have been
characterized thus:
[A]n optimum solution can normally be arrived at only by vesting a single decision-
maker with "managerial" authority-by which I mean authority not only to apply
relevant criteria, but to determine how much weight each criterion is to receive and
to change those weights as new objectives and criteria may require. In such cases the
decisionmaker may not use improper criteria, and should apply the same criteria to
all those similarly situated, but while he holds his position he can appropriately
give to all proper criteria whatever weight he thinks appropriate.
Eisenberg, supra note 285, at 425.
295. As Professor Fuller put it in a slightly different context, "The transformation by
which economic relations that ought to remain flexible tend to crystallize into 'rights' is,
in effect, the same process I attempted to describe when I spoke of cases where adjudica-
tion, instead of accommodating its forms to a polycentric problem, has accommodated the
problem to its forms." Adjudication, supra note 285, at 404. Elsewhere, Professor Fuller
noted that, "The standard American solution for polycentric problems . . . is to move
toward 'judicalizing' or 'legalizing' the administrative tasks they involve." Mediation,
suPra note 285, at 337.
296. In this way the ADA will grant to judges a high degree of policy discretion. In
consequence, the social policy that the ADA must shape may be fashioned less by institu-
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may abandon their adjudicatory lifejackets and plunge heroically into
the rising waters of allocative problem-solving. But they are soon
likely to find themselves in over their heads, for their ability to devise
suitable criteria for deciding such cases is, and is likely to remain,
severely limited.2 9
7
Judicial policymaking under the ADA, however incompetent it may
prove to be, nonetheless appears inevitable. When it occurs, it will
doubtless be perceived as a judicial arrogation of powers that ought
properly to be exercised elsewhere. 298 In the end, however, the abject
institutional failures of Congress and the Executive Branch in the case
of the ADA necessarily put this question in a somewhat different and
more uncertain light. For Congress to enact a law based largely upon
conflicting premises and then to refuse to define or even guide its
policy except through broad intimations of sentiment is to require
other institutions to fill this void.290 For the Executive Branch first to
abdicate its policy-shaping role in the legislative process and then
effectively to delegate the hard discretionary choices to the courts is
not merely to invite judicial policymaking but to compel it.3°° When
this comes to pass, and the judiciary has been duly denounced as "im-
perial," it will be well to recall that in this case, at least, its crown, like
that offered to Shakespeare's Caesar, was neither requested nor usurped
but was pressed upon it by politicians at the Capitol.
tions that characteristically engage in social choice than by those that are relatively ill-
equipped to do so (and are obliged, even when incontrovertibly doing so, to pretend that
they are doing otherwise). The explanation for this turnabout may lie as much in the
fiction that a nondiscrimination law supplies a court with authoritative, preexisting rules
that need only be elaborated logically, as it does in any belief that courts will somehow
make sounder, fairer policy judgments.
297. See, e.g., D. HoRowirz, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 106-70 (1977) (discussing
deficiencies of judicially developed criteria for allocation of education funds); Adjudica-
tion, supra note 285, at 400 (problems in allocating economic resources not appropriate to
adjudication). But see Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281, 1308 (1976) (courts have unique capacities to perform complex tasks); Eisenberg
& Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation (courts have
long performed tasks of equal or greater complexity) (unpublished, forthcoming in
Harvard Law Review).
298. Cf. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREMsE COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 175 (1970) (courts
too remote to deal with complex problems); Glazer, Should Judges Administer Social
Services? 50 PUB. INTEREST 64 (1978) (bureaucrats and administrators better equipped than
courts).
299. As Louis Jaffe has put it in a closely analogous context, Congress has simply
delegated the policymaking to others and "hope[d] for the best." L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CON-
TROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION 49 (1965).
300. Some commentators have suggested that the courts, by resort to certain doctrinal
strategies, refuse to play this role where fundamental policy issues have been left un-
resolved by Congress. E.g., T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM 128-56 (1969) (discussing
nondelegation doctrine); Gewirtz, Congress, the Courts and Executive Policy-Making, 40
LAW & CoNTEMp. PROB. (No. 3) 46, 49-80 (1976) (nondelegation doctrine and clear state-
ment doctrine).
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